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On the Nature of Welsh VSO Clauses1
 
Robert D. Borsley 
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1. Introduction 
 
Like the other Celtic languages, Welsh is VSO language with a verb before 
the subject in finite clauses. The following illustrate: 
 
(1)a. Welodd Emrys ddafad. 
        saw       Emrys sheep 
        ‘Emrys saw a sheep.’ 
     b. Aeth Megan i   Aberystwyth. 
         went Megan to Aberystwyth 
         ‘Megan went to Aberystwyth.’ 
 
A central question in generative discussion is whether such clauses have a 
basic SVO structure. Roberts (forthcoming, chapter 1) remarks that ‘the 
general consensus of work on Welsh’ is ‘that VSO clauses involve an 
operation which moves the verb out of VP to the left over the subject’. It 
seems to me that this is correct. It has been assumed in almost all 
transformational work on Welsh that VSO order is the result of verb-
movement. This includes in chronological order Jones and Thomas (1977), 
Harlow (1981), Sproat (1985), Sadler (1988), Rouveret (1994), Willis 
(1998), and Roberts (forthcoming). A basic SVO structure has also been 
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assumed within Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar in Borsley (1988) 
and within Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG) in Bresnan (2001: chapter 7, 
section 1.1). In contrast, only a few works have assumed analyses in which 
there is no basic SVO structure. The earliest work on Welsh syntax within 
generative grammar, Awbery (1976), assumed a basic VSO structure, and 
Tallerman (1991) argued against an SVO analysis. There is also no SVO 
structure in the Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG) analyses of 
Borsley (1989a, 1995). Other things being equal, an SVO analysis is more 
complex than a non-SVO analysis. Thus, the burden of proof is on 
advocates of an SVO analysis. In this paper I want to consider whether this 
burden has been met. I will argue that it has not been. 
The SVO analysis of VSO sentences is a fairly typical 
transformational analysis. It is generally accepted within transformational 
work that the superficial word order of clauses may be the result of 
movement processes. In a major challenge to what they call ‘mainstream 
generative grammar’, Culicover and Jackendoff (forthcoming) argue at 
length on the basis of English data that such analyses are unnecessary. The 
argument developed here can be seen as providing some support for their 
position. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I sketch a number of 
analyses which have been or might be proposed for Welsh VSO clauses. 
Then in section 3, I consider a variety of arguments that have been advanced 
or might be advanced for an SVO analysis of VSO clauses. In section 4, I 
consider some data which might pose problems for an SVO analysis. 
Finally, in section 5, I summarize the paper. 
2 
2. Analyses of Welsh VSO clauses 
 
As is indicated by the Roberts quote above, most transformational analyses 
assume that VSO order results from movement of the verb out of VP to the 
left over the subject. Some analyses assume that the subject remains within 
VP. Others assume that it too is extracted from the VP. For example, 
Rouveret (1994) develops an analysis within Principles and Parameters 
theory (P&P) involving structures like the  following: 
 
(2)                         AgrP 
 
                    Agr                   TP 
 
              Ti     Agr      DPk               T’ 
 
         Vj     T                            Ti             VP 
 
                                                        DPk           V’ 
  
                                                                   Vj          DP 
 
 
            welodd         Emrys      t        t         t        ddafad 
 
Here we have two functional heads, Agr(eement) and T(ense), outside the 
VP, within which both the verb and the subject originate. The verb moves to 
T and then the combination of the verb and T moves to Agr. The subject 
moves to the specifier position of T.2
 Within LFG, there is no movement and no traces, but it is possible 
for V to appear outside the associated VP, and Bresnan (2001: 127-131) 
proposes that this is the situation in Welsh VSO clauses.3 Within this 
approach, (1) would have the following structure: 
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 (3)                        IP 
 
                           I                           S 
 
                                             NP              VP 
 
                                                                NP 
 
           welodd        Emrys         ddafad 
 
It is also possible to adopt an SVO analysis within HPSG. Some 
work in HPSG has assumed an analogue of verb-movement. See e.g. 
Borsley (1989b). Obviously, this allows an SVO analysis. An SVO analysis 
is also possible in the version of HPSG developed in Kathol (2000). Kathol 
proposes that constituents have an order domain, to which ordering 
constraints apply. The domain elements of a constituent may be 
‘compacted’ to form a single element in the order domain of the mother or 
they may just become elements in the mother’s order domain. In the latter 
case, the mother has more domain elements than daughters. Within this 
framework, (1) might have the following schematic analysis:  
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⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
>⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡<
>⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡<
NP SYNSEM
 PHON
 ,
NP SYNSEM
 PHON
 ,
V SYNSEM
 PHON
 DOM
VP SYNSEM
  PHON
 ,
NP SYNSEM
 PHON
 DTRS
S SYNSEM
   PHON
ddafadEmryswelodd
ddafadweloddEmrys
ddafadEmryswelodd
 
Here we have two daughters but three domain elements. An analysis like 
this is in fact assumed for German verb-initial clauses in Kathol (2000).  
It seems, then, that an SVO analysis is available in a variety of 
frameworks.  Is it required in some? An SVO analysis is more or less 
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required within a framework such as P&P or Minimalism, which limits 
itself to binary branching. In such a framework, unless one assumes that the 
verb and subject form a constituent, one must assume that the subject and 
the complement or complements form one.4
It seems that the main example of a non-SVO analysis of Welsh 
VSO clauses is that developed within HPSG in Borsley (1989a, 1995). In a 
version of HPSG which does not have an analogue of verb-movement or 
order domains, a VSO clause cannot contain a VP and the obvious 
assumption is that we have a flat structure in which subject and object are 
both sisters of the verb. There are two analyses that one might propose here. 
In one, the subject is a realization of the SUBJ feature and the object a 
realization of the COMPS feature as in (5), where I use the familiar tree 
format to represent constituent structure.  
 
(5)                                            V 
                                       ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
<>
<>
 COMPS
 SUBJ
 
                 V                       [1]NP         [2]NP 
      ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
><
><
[2] COMPS
[1] SUBJ
 
 
            welodd                    Emrys        ddafad 
 
On the other, the subject is a realization of an extra member of the COMPS 
list and the verb has an empty SUBJ list. This gives the following structure: 
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(6)                                   V 
                                     ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
<>
<>
 COMPS
 SUBJ
 
                 V                       [1]NP         [2]NP 
    ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
><
<>
[2]],1[ COMPS
 SUBJ
 
 
             welodd                     Emrys        ddafad 
 
Borsley (1989a, 1995) argues that the latter is appropriate for Welsh, but 
Borsley (1995) argues that the former approach is appropriate for Syrian 
Arabic.5 The main motivation for this approach is that it automatically 
accounts for the fact that the subject of a finite clause follows the verb. 
Borsley proposes that subjects of non-finite verbs are a realization of the 
SUBJ feature. Thus, this approach involves a major contrast between the 
finite and non-finite verbs.  
 Both these approaches distinguish subjects and objects. On the first 
approach, the subject is a realization of the SUBJ feature and the object a 
realization of the COMPS feature. On the second, the subject is a realization 
of the first element on the COMPS list and the object a realization of the 
second element. In both approaches, both constituents are immediately 
dominated by the sentence node. Hence, neither approach distinguishes 
them in terms of dominance.  It often seems to be assumed that subject and 
object can only be distinguished in terms of dominance.  Thus, Carnie and 
Guilfoyle (2000: 4) suggest that a flat structure ‘predicts that subject and 
object NPs, since they are both postverbal, should not be distinguishable in 
contexts where only one NP argument appears’. This would only be true if 
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subjects and objects could only be distinguished in terms of dominance, but 
as we have just seen, there are other ways.6
Interestingly, there is one respect in which subjects and objects could 
be said to be indistinguishable in Welsh. It involves agreement. When a 
non-finite verb is followed by a pronominal object, it shows agreement in 
the form of a proclitic. Thus, while there is no proclitic in (7a), a proclitic 
appears in (7b). 
 
 (7)a. Naeth      Emrys weld y    bachgen.  
          did-3SG Emrys see    the boy       
          ‘Emrys saw the boy.’ 
      b. Naeth     Emrys ei        weld o.  
          did-3SG Emrys 3SGM see   he 
          ‘Emrys saw him.’ 
 
Welsh has one situation in which what looks like a non-finite verb is 
followed by a subject. This is in certain subordinate clauses introduced by 
bod ‘be’. When the subject of such a clause is pronoun, the verb is preceded 
by a proclitic. Thus, we have examples like the following (where bod 
appears as fod because of soft mutation, a morphophonological process 
affecting initial consonants): 
 
 (8)a. Dywedodd Gwyn fod Emrys  yn       ddiog.  
         said             Gwyn be   Emrys PRED lazy  
         ‘Gwyn said Emrys was lazy.’ 
                b. Dywedodd Gwyn  ei        fod (o) yn       ddiog.  
         said             Gwyn 3SGM be   he PRED lazy  
         ‘Gwyn said he was lazy.’ 
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Thus, as noted in Borsley (1983), we have an agreement process here which 
ignores the difference between subjects and objects. It seems in fact that 
Welsh agreement does not refer to grammatical functions. I argue in Borsley 
(2003) that it involves certain heads and an immediately following pronoun. 
We will return to agreement facts below. 
 
 
3. Arguments for an SVO analysis 
 
We turn now to arguments that have been proposed or might be proposed 
for an SVO analysis. There has been considerable discussion here, but there 
is little in the way of carefully formulated arguments. Therefore, to a 
considerable extent it is necessary to look for the arguments that are implicit 
in various discussions. 
 
 
3.1. VP-like constituents 
 
One strand of argument for an SVO analysis of VSO clauses has highlighted the 
existence of VP-like constituents. Thus, Carnie and Guilfoyle (2000: 5) 
highlight the fact that ‘[a] great body of empirical evidence has surfaced 
showing that many VSO languages have VP-like constituents which consist 
of a non-finite verb and object but exclude the subject’. Welsh is no 
exception here. In Welsh, a VP-like constituent appears in non-finite 
clauses, sentences containing the auxiliary gwneud ‘do’, and certain 
aspectual sentences. The following illustrate: 
 
(9) Mae Siôn yn        disgwyl [i   Emrys [ddarllen llyfr]] 
      is     Siôn PROG expect     to Emrys  read        book 
      ‘Siôn expects Emrys to read a book.’ 
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(10) Naeth Siôn [ddarllen llyfr] 
        did     Siôn   read       book 
        ‘Siôn read a book.’ 
(11) Mae Siôn [yn       darllen llyfr] 
        is     Siôn  PROG read     book 
        ‘Siôn is reading a book.’ 
 
In (9), we have a clause which resembles an English for-to clause. It is 
introduced by what looks like the preposition i ‘to’, ‘for’. This is followed by 
the subject and a VP-like constituent appears as the predicate. I will call such 
clauses i–clauses. In the most detailed discussion of these clauses, 
Tallerman (1998) proposes that they have essentially the same structure as 
VSO clauses but with the prepositional element i in the position which is 
occupied by the verb in VSO clauses. In (10) a VP-like constituent appears as 
the complement of the auxiliary gwneud ‘do’. Sentences like these are 
assumed by Harlow (1981: 223) and Sproat (1985: 202) to have the same 
structure as simple VSO clauses but with gwneud-insertion instead of verb-
movement, and an analogous position is assumed within LFG in Bresnan 
(2000: 127-131). Essentially, the idea here is that these sentences reveal the 
basic structure of VSO clauses. Interestingly, however, both Rouveret 
(1994) and Roberts (forthcoming) assume that gwneud clauses have more 
complex structures than simple VSO clauses. In (11), we have a slightly 
more complex constituent, in which the non-finite verb is preceded by the 
progressive particle yn. We might assume that this is not a VP but an Aspect 
Phrase or a Progressive Phrase. Complements in raising sentences such as 
(12) and control sentences such as (13) are also potentially relevant given 
the arguments in Borsley (1984) that they are VPs.  
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 (12) Dechreuodd Megan ddarllen y    llyfr. 
         began           Megan read       the book 
         ‘Megan began to read the book.’ 
 (13) Ceisiodd Megan ddarllen y    llyfr. 
         tried        Megan read       the book 
         ‘Megan tried to read the book.’ 
 
Of course, such complements are standardly analyzed as clauses of some 
kind in transformational work, so some would think that they are not 
relevant here. I will concentrate on examples like (9) and (10) in the 
following paragraphs. 
How exactly are VP-like constituents relevant here? Such 
constituents might support an SVO analysis of VSO clauses if some 
principle required all forms of a word to be associated with the same kind of 
structure. This would entail that if some verb forms are associated with a VP 
all verb forms must be associated with a VP. In other words, we might have 
the following argument: 
 
(14) Argument from uniform structures 
 
All forms of a word must be associated with the same kind of  
syntactic structure. 
Non-finite verbs are associated with a VP. 
 
Therefore, finite verbs must be associated with a VP. 
 
Within a transformational framework we can interpret ‘associated with’ as 
‘originate in’. Within LFG it will have a slightly different interpretation.  
The problem with this argument is the first premise. There is 
evidence in Welsh that different finite forms of the same verb may be 
associated with different structures. Consider first the following data: 
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(15)a. Mae Gwyn (*ddim) yn        hwyr. 
           is      Gwyn   NEG   PRED late 
           ‘Gwyn is (not) late.’ 
       b. Dydy    Gwyn *(ddim) yn        hwyr. 
           NEG-is Gwyn    NEG   PRED late 
           ‘Gwyn is (not) late.’ 
 
Here we see that present tense forms of the copula include mae, which may 
not combine with ddim to form a negative sentence and dydy, which must 
combine with ddim to form a negative sentence.7 Consider now the 
following: 
 
 (16)a. Mae/*ydy Gwyn yn        athro.  
           is        is     Gwyn PRED teacher 
           ‘Gwyn is a teacher.’ 
                  b. Athro   ydy/*mae Gwyn. 
           teacher is      is     Gwyn 
           ‘Gwyn is a teacher.’ 
 
(16a) is a simple VSO clause containing a predicate nominal, and we have 
mae and not ydy. (The latter is possible in an interrogative.) In (16b) the 
predicate nominal is in initial position (without the particle yn), and we can 
only have ydy and not mae. Finally, consider the following: 
 
 (17)a. Mae/*sydd Gwyn yn        canu. 
            is        is      Gwyn PROG sing 
            ‘Gwyn is singing.’ 
        b. Gwyn sydd/*mae yn        canu. 
            Gwyn is         is     PROG sing 
            ‘It is Gwyn that is singing.’ 
 
11 
(17a) is a simple VSO clause and we have mae and not sydd. (17b) has a 
‘fronted’ subject and we can only have sydd and not mae. There is also 
evidence that different forms of the same adjective may be associated with 
different structures. Consider the following: 
 
(18)a. da      (*â/*na    Gwyn) 
          good     as  than Gwyn 
      b. cystal    (â/*na   Gwyn) 
          as-good  as than Gwyn 
      c. well   (*â/ na    Gwyn) 
          better    as than Gwyn 
 
Welsh adjectives typically have distinct equative and comparative forms, 
which combine with distinctive constituents expressing the standard of 
comparison. Neither can combine with the type of constituent with which 
the other combines and the basic form of an adjective cannot combine with 
either type of constituent. It seems, then, that the first premise is untenable 
and hence that the Argument from uniform structures is fundamentally 
flawed. 
 An SVO analysis of VSO clauses might also be plausible if i-clauses 
and gwneud clauses were like simple VSO clauses in all respects except 
word order. The similarities would call for an explanation and the 
assumption that all clauses have a basic SVO structure might provide one.8 
In other words, we might have the following argument: 
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 (19) Argument from similar properties 
 
If a number of clause types have the same properties apart from 
word order they must have the same syntactic structure at some 
level. 
VSO clauses have the same properties apart from word order as 
i-clauses and gwneud clauses. 
 
Therefore, VSO clauses must have the same syntactic structure 
at some level as i-clauses and gwneud clauses. 
 
Notice that VSO clauses would have the same structure at some level as i-
clauses and gwneud clauses if the latter involved a VSO structure in some 
way.9 Thus, this argument would not by itself provide motivation for an 
SVO analysis of VSO clauses. However, the argument is untenable because 
the second premise is false. I-clauses and gwneud clauses differ from simple 
VSO clauses in the realization of agreement and negation.  
A Welsh finite verb agrees with a subject if it is pronominal, as the 
following illustrates: 
 
(20) Mi    est             ti             i   Aberystwyth. 
        PRT went-2SG you(SG) to Aberystwyth 
        ‘You went to Aberystwyth.’ 
 
As noted earlier, non-finite verbs show agreement in the form of a proclitic, 
but they agree with a following object (if it is pronominal). We see this in 
the following i-clause: 
 
(21) Dw i ’n        disgwyl i   Mair  dy    weld di. 
        am  I  PROG expect to Mair  2SG see    you 
        ‘I expect Mair to see you.’ 
 
The verb in an i-clause does not agree with the subject. Hence (22) is 
ungrammatical with the proclitic.  
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(22) Dw i ’n        disgwyl i   ti           (*dy)    fynd i   Aberystwyth. 
        am I  PROG expect  to you(SG)    2SG go    to Aberystwyth 
        ‘I expect you to go to Aberystwyth.’ 
 
We have the same situation in gwneud clauses, as (7b), repeated here as 
(23), and (24) show: 
 
 (23) Naeth     Emrys ei        weld o.  
        did-3SG Emrys 3SGM see   he 
        ‘Emrys saw him.’ 
(24) Naeth Emrys   (*ei)       fynd i   Aberystwyth. 
        did      Emrys     3SGM go    to Aberystwyth 
        ‘He went to Aberystwyth.’ 
 
As noted earlier, we have what looks like agreement between a non-finite 
verb and a subject in examples like the following:  
 
(25) Mae Aled yn        credu  [ei       bod hi   yn       darllen y    llyfr] 
        is     Aled PROG believe 3SGF be   she PROG read     the book 
        ‘Aled believes that she is/was reading the book.’ 
 
This, however, is a rather different type of clause with verb-subject order. 
Essentially bod appears here instead of present and imperfect forms of the 
copula, which cannot appear in affirmative complement clauses, and 
Tallerman (1998) argues that such clauses are finite despite appearances. 
Such examples do not alter the fact that agreement behaves quite differently 
in clear examples of non-finite clauses and finite clauses. 
A further aspect of agreement that we should note is the fact that the 
prepositional element i agrees with the following subject in much the same 
way as a finite verb agrees with the following subject. The following 
illustrates:  
14 
(26) Mae Siôn yn        disgwyl iddo         fo ddarllen llyfr. 
        is     Siôn PROG expect    to-3SGM he read       book 
        ‘Siôn expects him to read a book.’ 
 
This suggests that the relation between a finite verb and the following 
subject is like the relation between i and the following subject. However, if 
VSO clauses involve structures like (27) and i-clauses involve structure like 
(28), as proposed in Borsley (1999), then the relation between a finite verb 
and the following subject is like the relation between i and the following 
subject. 
 
 (27)                    S 
 
               V            NP           ... 
 
 (28)                    S 
 
               P            NP          VP 
 
Moreover, as noted above, I have argued in Borsley (2003) that constraints 
on agreement just refer to linear order. If this is right, the data we are 
concerned with here cannot tell us anything about the structural relation 
between the agreeing elements. 
 Turning to negation we again find a major difference between simple 
VSO clauses and i-clauses and gwneud clauses. A VSO clause is generally 
negated by the post-subject negative adverb ddim, as indicated earlier. 
 
(29) Est             ti            ddim i  Aberystwyth. 
        went-2SG you(SG) NEG to Aberystwyth 
        ‘You did not go to Aberystwyth.’ 
 
An i-clause is negated not with ddim but with peidio, a defective verb with 
only a non-finite and imperative forms in the colloquial language, whose 
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only content is negation. Thus, the negative counterpart of (30a) is not (30b) 
but (30c) (where peidio appears as beidio as a result of soft mutation). 
 
(30)a. Dw i ’n         disgwyl i   Mair fynd i  Aberystwyth. 
           am I  PROG expect   to Mair go    to Aberystwyth 
           ‘I expect Mair to go to Aberystwyth.’ 
      b. *Dw i ’n        disgwyl i   Mair ddim mynd i  Aberystwyth. 
             am I  PROG expect  to Mair NEG go      to Aberystwyth 
             ‘I expect Mair not to go to Aberystwyth.’ 
      c. Dw i ’n         disgwyl i   Mair beidio (â)    mynd i  Aberystwyth. 
          am I  PROG expect  to Mair NEG    with go     to Aberystwyth 
          ‘I expect Mair not to go to Aberystwyth.’ 
 
The situation is more complex in gwneud clauses. Borsley and Jones (2000, 
2001, in press) argue that Welsh has a negative adverb ddim and a negative 
quantifier dim (or ddim if mutated). A gwneud clause with a transitive verb can 
be negated by the adverb ddim, but a VSO sentence with a transitive verb 
cannot be.10 Thus, we have the following contrast: 
 
(31) Naeth Siôn ddim gweld y    defaid. 
        did     Siôn NEG see      the sheep 
        ‘Siôn did not see the sheep.’ 
(32) *Welodd Siôn ddim y    defaid. 
          saw       Siôn NEG the sheep 
          ‘Siôn did not see the sheep.’ 
 
In contrast, a VSO sentence with a transitive verb can be negated by a 
negative object, including an object containing the quantifier dim. A gwneud 
clause cannot be. Thus, we have a contrast between (33) and (34).11
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(33)a. Welodd Siôn neb. 
           saw       Siôn no one 
           ‘Siôn did not see anyone.’ 
      b. Welodd Siôn ddim o  ’r     defaid.  
           saw       Siôn NEG of  the sheep 
           ‘Siôn did not see the sheep.’ 
(34)a. *Naeth Siôn weld neb. 
            did     Siôn see   no one 
            ‘Siôn did not see anyone.’ 
      b. *Naeth Siôn weld dim   o  ’r     defaid. 
            did      Siôn see    NEG of  the sheep 
            ‘Siôn did not see the sheep.’ 
 
(33b) is the grammatical counterpart of (32).  
 Thus we have two important differences between VSO clauses on 
the one hand and i-clauses and gwneud clauses on the other. They do not 
differ just in word order but also in agreement and negation. Hence, as 
stated, the argument from identical properties is untenable. The most one 
might be able to argue is that there are important similarities between VSO 
clauses and certain other types of clause, which can be most easily 
accommodated if VSO clauses have an SVO structure. We will consider a 
number of arguments of this kind in the following pages. 
 
 
3.2. Anaphora  
 
Another type of argument for an SVO analysis involves contrasts between 
subjects and objects. Carnie and Guilfoyle (2000: 6) suggest that a flat 
structure predicts that ‘there will be no structure dependent subject/object 
asymmetries in VSO languages’. It appears that they are thinking of 
contrasts with respect to anaphora. Welsh displays such contrasts.  
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In Welsh, the subject of a VSO clause can be the antecedent of an 
anaphor in object position but the object of a VSO clause cannot be the 
antecedent of an anaphor in subject position. 
 
(35)a. Welodd Gwyn ei         hun. 
          saw        Gwyn 3SGM self 
          ‘Gwyn saw himself.’ 
      b. *Welodd ei        hun Megan. 
            saw       3SGM self Megan 
 
This is like the situation in i-clauses and gwneud clauses. 
 
(36)a. Disgwyliodd Megan i   Gwyn weld ei        hun. 
          expected        Megan to Gwyn see   3SGM self 
          ‘Megan expected Gwyn to see himself.’ 
      b. *Disgwyliodd Megan i   ei        hun weld Gwyn. 
            expected       Megan to 3SGM self  see  Gwyn 
(37)a. Naeth Gwyn weld ei         hun. 
          did      Gwyn see    3SGM self 
          ‘Gwyn saw himself.’ 
      b. *Naeth ei        hun weld Gwyn. 
            did     3SGM self see   Gwyn 
 
If binding theory refers to constituent structure and in particular if it requires 
an anaphor to be c-commanded by its antecedent, such data shows that the 
subject of a VSO clause must c-command the object and not vice versa, and 
hence supports the idea that the object is inside a VP constituent. Thus, we 
have the following argument (which is implicit in Borsley 1988). 
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(38) Argument from anaphora 
 
An anaphor must be asymmetrically c-commanded by   
its antecedent. 
A anaphor can appear in object position in a VSO clause with 
its antecedent in subject position, but not vice versa. 
 
Therefore, object position in a VSO clause must be 
asymmetrically c-commanded by subject position, but not vice 
versa. 
 
The problem with this argument is the first premise. There is 
evidence in Welsh as in English that an anaphor is not always c-commanded 
by its antecedent. Consider the following: 
 
(39) Nes        i sôn [wrth Gwyn] [am      ei     hunan] 
       did-2SG I talk  to     Gwyn    about 3SG self  
       ‘I talked to Gwyn about himself.’   
 
Here, in the Welsh example as in the English translation, the antecedent is 
inside one PP complement and the reflexive inside another. There is no 
obvious reason to think that such examples fall outside the scope of the 
main conditions on anaphora. Thus, such examples suggest rather strongly 
that an anaphor is not necessarily c-commanded by its antecedent. Pollard 
and Sag (1992, 1994) argue in part on the basis of examples like the English 
translation that constraints on anaphora refer to argument structures and not 
to constituent structures, and a similar conclusion is reached on the basis of 
rather different data by Culicover and Jackendoff (1992, 1995) and 
Jackendoff (1997). It is also assumed within LFG that constraints on 
anaphora refer to f-structures (Bresnan 2000, chapter 10). In fact, the idea 
that constraints on anaphora refer to constituent structures seems to be 
confined to P&P. Clearly, if constraints on anaphora do not refer to 
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constituent structure, anaphora cannot show anything about constituent 
structure.  
 
 
3.3. Coordination 
 
In a detailed discussion of Irish VSO clauses, McCloskey (1991) argues that 
coordination provides evidence that both the material following the verb and 
the material following the subject is a constituent. One might try to use 
coordination to argue for the same conclusions in Welsh. 
 Rather like one type of Irish example cited by McCloskey is the 
bracketed subordinate clause in the following: 
 
(40) Dw i ’n         gwbod [na     fydd     Mair yna   neu Gwyn yma] 
       am  I  PROG know    NEG will-be Mair there nor Gwyn here 
       ‘I know Mair will not be there nor Gwyn here.’ 
 
This clause contains two conjuncts consisting of a subject and a complement. 
Rather like a second type of Irish example cited by McCloskey is (43). 
 
(41) Rhoddodd yr   un  dyn  lyfr    i   Mair a     darlun   i   Megan. 
       gave           the one man book to Mair and  picture to Megan 
       ‘The same man gave a book to Mair and a picture to Megan.’ 
 
Here we have two conjuncts consisting of a pair of complements. These 
examples have implications for constituent sructure if we assume that 
conjuncts must be constituents. We have the following argument: 
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(42) First argument from coordination 
 
A conjunct must be a constituent. 
Both the material following the verb and the material following 
the subject  
in a VSO clause can be a conjunct. 
 
Therefore, both the material following the verb and the material 
following the subject in a VSO clause must be a constituent. 
 
We obviously need to ask here whether the first premise is sound. There are 
reasons for scepticism about it. 
 It is quite widely assumed that English examples like the following 
involve conjuncts that are not constituents: 
  
(43) I gave 5 pounds to Kim and 10 pounds to Lee. 
 
Here, the conjuncts consist of a pair of complements. It has generally been 
assumed in P&P since Larson (1988) that such sequences are constituents, 
but this assumption is rejected in most other frameworks. See, for examples, 
Sag et al. (1985) and Maxwell and Manning (1996).12 Welsh has similar 
examples, e.g. the following: 
 
(44) Mae Gwyn wedi    rhoi lyfr    i   Mair a     darlun   i   Megan. 
         is     Gwyn PERF give book to Mair and picture to Megan 
         ‘Gwyn has given a book to Mair and a picture to Megan.’ 
 
If examples like (43) and (44) involve coordination of non-constituents, then 
the first premise in (42) is untenable.  
Some evidence that this premise is indeed untenable comes from the 
following examples: 
 
(45)a. Mae Gwyn wedi  gweld Sioned ym Mangor a     Megan yng  
          Nghaernarfon 
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           is     Gwyn PERF see     Sioned in   Bangor  and Megan in     
          Caernarfon 
 ‘Gwyn has seen Sioned in Bangor and Megan in  
Caernarfon.’ 
       b. Mae Gwyn wedi   prynu dafad  a    gwerthu gafr yng  
           Nghaernarfon. 
           is     Gwyn PERF buy     sheep and sold       goat in     
           Caernarfon 
           ‘Gwyn has sold a sheep and bought a goat in Caernarfon.’ 
 
In (45a), the conjuncts consist of a complement and an adjunct. In (45b), 
they consist of a verb and a complement. Unless we assume two different 
structures for the sequence verb + complement + adjunct, one or other of 
these examples must involve conjuncts which are not constituents. 
 Other sorts of example cast doubt on the first premise of (42). 
Consider the following: 
 
(46)a. Darllenodd Gwyn a     sgrifennodd Megan lyfr     
          read            Gwyn and wrote           Megan book  
          am    ieithyddiaeth. 
          about linguistics  
          ‘Gwyn read and Megan wrote a book about linguistics.’ 
      b. Rhoddodd Gwyn a      gwerthodd Emrys lyfr   i    Mair. 
          gave          Gwyn and sold           Emrys book to Mair 
           ‘Gwyn gave and Emrys sold a book to Mair.’ 
 
Here the conjuncts consist of a finite verb and a subject. If ordinary VSO 
clauses have a single structure, then finite verb and the subject cannot be a 
constituent if the subject and the complement(s) are a constituent. Examples 
like these are standardly said to involve right node raising. This might suggest 
that they are a special sort of example, which shows nothing about ‘ordinary’ 
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coordination. However, right node raising is hardly a well understood process, 
and it is not obvious that there is a clear cut distinction between ‘ordinary’ 
coordination and right node raising. This assumption is in fact rejected within 
Combinatory Categorial Grammar (Steedman 2000). Within this framework, 
an unambiguous sentence can have a variety of different structures and hence 
all the examples we have just considered can be instances of constituent-
coordination. However, if we assume that an unambiguous sentence normally 
has a single structure, we must apparently conclude that coordination is not a 
good guide to constituent structure. Given this conclusion, examples like (40) 
and (41) do not show that post-verbal and post-subject material in a VSO 
clause must be constituents. 
 
 
3.4. More on coordination 
 
A second argument involving coordination might be advanced on the basis 
of what Rouveret (1994: 302) calls the serial construction. The following 
illustrates: 
 
(47) Daeth Megan i   mewn ac   eistedd i   lawr 
        came  Megan to in        and sit        to down 
        ‘Megan came in and sat down.’ 
 
Here we appear to have have a coordinate structure in which the second 
conjunct is a (non-finite) VP. If one assumes that conjuncts must be 
members of the same category, then the first conjunct must be a VP. As 
Rouveret notes, this is apparently possible if one assumes an SVO analysis 
of VSO clauses. One might propose something like the following analysis:13
 
(48) [Daethi [Megan [[t i i mewn] ac [eistedd i lawr]]]] 
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Here we have conjoined VPs and the verb has been extracted from the first 
of them giving rise to verb-subject order. The argument here takes the 
following form: 
 
(49) Second argument from coordination 
 
Conjuncts must be members of the same category. 
The second conjunct in the serial construction is a VP. 
 
Therefore, the first conjunct in the serial construction must be a 
VP. 
 
This argument faces a number of problems. First, it is not completely 
clear that the serial construction is an example of a coordinate structure. 
Abeillé (2003) suggests that it in fact involves a head and one or more 
adjuncts. She draws attention here to examples like the following from 
Sadler (2003). 
 
(50) I  ’r    ty       yr     aethant     ac    eistedd a     bwyta. 
        to the house PRT went.3PL and sit-VN  and eat-VN  
        ‘It's to the house that they went and sat and ate.’ 
 
This example involves a fronted constituent and Abeillé suggests that it 
would involve a violation of the Coordinate Structure Constraint, which 
bans extraction from one conjunct of a coordinate structure, if it were an 
example of a coordinate structure. However, a proponent of a coordination 
analysis might argue that the fronted constituent is within the first conjunct.  
 Even if the serial construction is an example of a coordinate 
structure, the argument in (49) is problematic. This is because the first 
premise seems untenable. There is fairly clear evidence in Welsh as in 
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English that conjuncts need not be members of the same category. The 
following illustrate one type of relevant example: 
 
(51)a. Mae Gwyn yn        ddiog ac   yn         cysgu. 
           is     Gwyn PRED lazy     and PROG sleep 
           ‘Gwyn is lazy and sleeping.’ 
      b. Mae Gwyn yn       ieithydd ac   yn        astudio Cymraeg. 
           is     Gwyn PRED linguist  and PROG study    Welsh 
          ‘Gwyn is a linguist and studying Welsh.’ 
 
These examples show that Welsh like English allows a coordinate structure 
with different categories as its conjuncts as the complement of the copula. 
Moreover, within the minimalist framework, we would probably have 
different categories in (48). Within this framework, finite verbs are 
introduced into the derivation with tense features and do not acquire them 
through movement. It seems to follow that the first VP in (48) will have 
tense features unlike the second VP. It seems, then, that this argument is not 
at all persuasive. 
 Moreover, there is an obvious objection to the analysis in (48). It 
clearly involves a violation of the Coordinate Structure Constraint. The 
following examples, where the gaps are marked by ‘___’, show that this is 
operative in Welsh. 
 
(52)a. *Pwy mae Gwyn [[wedi   ei        weld ___] ac  [wedi  clywed  
            who  is     Gwyn   PERF 3SGM see            and PERF hear      
           Megan]] 
            Megan 
            *‘Who has Gwyn seen and heard Megan?’ 
      b. *Pwy [[mae Gwyn wedi   ei         weld ___] ac  [mae Emrys  
            who    is     Gwyn PERF 3SGM see            and  is     Emrys  
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            wedi   clywed Megan]] 
            PERF     hear      Megan 
            *‘Who has Gwyn seen and has Emrys heard Megan?’ 
 
Thus, not only is there no real reason to adopt the analysis in (48), there is a 
good reason for rejecting it. 14
 
 
3.5. Ellipsis  
 
A further area in which one might look for arguments for an SVO analysis 
is ellipsis. Examples like the following from Jones (1999) are of interest 
here: 
 
 (53)a. Mi   newidith               Sion ’i          feddwl 
           AFF change.FUT.3SG Sion  3SGM mind 
           ‘Sion will change his mind.’ 
      b. Neith             o   ddim (newid   ’i          feddwl). 
          do.FUT.3SG he NEG   change  3SGM mind 
          ‘He won’t (change his mind).’ 
 
The second sentence is a gwneud clause, and as the bracketing indicates, the 
VP complement may be omitted. If it is omitted, the antecedent is 
apparently the finite verb and the object in the first sentence. Such data 
might lead one to argue as follows: 
 
(54) Argument from antecedents for ellipsis 
 
The antecedent for ellipsis must be a syntactic constituent at 
some level. 
A finite verb and its complement can be the antecedent for 
ellipsis 
 
Therefore, a finite verb and its complement must be a syntactic 
constituent at some level. 
 
We can argue, however, that the first premise of this argument is untenable. 
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Culicover and Jackendoff (in preparation, chapter 5) argue at length 
against the idea that antecedents for ellipsis must be a syntactic constituent 
at some level. They pay particular attention to bare argument ellipsis, where 
a phrase of some kind is interpretated as a clause. Welsh seems to have 
essentially the same construction. Consider, for example, the following: 
 
(55) Welodd Gwyn Emrys, ond dim Sioned. 
         saw       Gwyn  Emrys but   not Sioned 
         ‘Gwyn saw Emrys, but not Sioned.’ 
 
Like its English translation, this is ambiguous. It can mean that Gwyn did 
not see Sioned or that Sioned did not see Emrys. On the second 
interpretation, the antecedent for ellipsis is the verb and the object, which is 
a constituent on an SVO analysis. However, on the first interpretation, the 
antecedent for ellipsis is the subject and the verb, which obviously do not 
form a constituent. Another relevant example is the following: 
  
(56) Rhoddodd Gwyn lyfr   i   Megan, ond dim papur newydd 
         gave          Gwyn book to Megan  but  not  paper new 
         ‘Gwyn gave a book to Megan but not a newspaper.’ 
 
This means that Gwyn did not give a newspaper to Megan. Thus the 
antecedent for ellipsis is the subject, the verb and the second complement. 
Clearly this is not a constituent. 
 Although the argument in (54) must be rejected, one might still try to 
use ellipsis to argue for an SVO analysis. It seems that post-subject material 
in a Welsh VSO sentence can generally undergo ellipsis. Thus, we have 
examples like the following:15
 
27 
 (57)a. Mi   eith                Sioned yn ôl heno 
           AFF go.FUT.1SG Sioned back  tonight 
           ‘Sioned will go back tonight.’ 
       b. Eith               hi   ddim (yn ôl heno). 
           go.FUT.2SG she NEG   back tomight 
           ‘She won’t (go back tonight).’ 
 (58)a. Mi   gan               nhw fwy o bres 
           AFF will-get.3PL they more of money 
           ‘They will get more money’ 
       b. Chan              nhw ddim (mwy  o   bres). 
           will-get-3PL they NEG   more of money 
           ‘They won’t get more money’ 
 
We might say that Welsh has post-subject ellipsis. However, someone might 
suggest that what is omitted is a VP. One might perhaps argue as follows: 
 
(59) Argument from VP-ellipsis properties 
 
If an ellipsis process has the properties of VP-ellipsis, it must   
be VP-ellipsis 
Post-subject ellipsis has the properties of VP-ellipsis 
 
Therefore, post-subject ellipsis must be VP-ellipsis 
 
This is essentially the argument that McCloskey (1991) advances in 
connection with rather similar data in Irish. Is it a good argument? 
Whatever may be the case in Irish, there seems to be at least one 
important difference between post-subject subject ellipsis in Welsh and VP-
ellipsis. The difference arises in connection with examples like (53). At least 
superficially the antecedent for ellipsis is discontinuous. Given the 
differences between English and Welsh, one would not expect VP ellipsis 
with a superficially discontinuous antecedent to be common in English. 
However, one would expect it to occur. Consider first (60). 
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 (60)a. Is Kim here? 
        b. No, but he will *(be here). 
 
Here, it is not possible to omit the VP be here in the second sentence 
although there is a form of be and here in the first sentence. Consider now 
(61). 
 
 (61)a. Has Kim gone? 
        b. No, but he will (*have gone) by noon. 
 
Here, it is not possible to omit the VP have gone although there is a form of 
have and gone in the first clause. It seems, then, that English VP ellipsis 
does not allow a superficially discontinuous antecedent.  
 No doubt, there are some similarities between Welsh post-subject 
ellipsis and English VP-ellipsis. After all they are both examples of ellipsis. 
However, the contrast just highlighted suggests that there is no reason to 
think that they are the same process. 
 
 
4. Possible evidence against an SVO structure 
 
As noted at the outset, an analysis that involves an SVO structure is more 
complex ceteris paribus than one that does not.  Hence, as long as there are 
no compelling arguments for such a structure, an analysis without one 
should be preferred. However it is important to consider whether there is 
any evidence against such a structure. We will consider three areas of 
grammar here and argue that there may well be problems for some SVO 
analyses. 
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4.1. Agreement 
 
We noted in 3.1 that contrasts between agreement in VSO clauses on the 
one hand and in i-clauses and gwneud clauses undermine one type of 
argument that might be advanced for an SVO analysis of VSO clauses. Do 
these contrasts pose any problems for an SVO analysis? 
 There is probably no problem within P&P. Within Rouveret’s 
analysis, illustrated in (2), agreement in finite clauses involves Agr and the 
following subject and is realized on the verb as a result of the movement of 
the verb through T to Agr. If i-clauses involve the same structure, agreement 
could only be realized on the verb if Welsh had some Agr lowering 
mechanism in i-clauses.16 If Welsh has no such mechanism, the verb will 
not agree with the subject in such clauses. As we noted earlier, Tallerman 
(1998) proposes that pre-subject i is a realization of Agr in an i-clause, and 
this seems a fairly plausible idea within P&P assumptions. It looks, then, as 
if there are probably no problems here.  
 What about LFG? As far as I can see, it is probably possible to adopt 
a similar position here, i.e. to assume that agreement involves I and the 
following subject and is realized on the verb in a finite clause because the 
verb is in I. 
 What finally of the HPSG analysis in (4)? As noted earlier, I argue 
in Borsley (2003) that constraints on agreement refer to linear order, in other 
words that they are constraints on order domains. Within this approach the 
fact that there is no agreement between a non-finite verb and the preceding 
subject is no problem. However, as noted in Borsley (2003), one would 
expect agreement between the verb in a VSO clause and a following 
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proniminal object given that the verb is immediately followed by the object 
within the order domain of the VP (not given in (4)). It looks, then, as if 
agreement provides an objection to the analysis in (4). 
 Thus, agreement probably poses no problems for an SVO analysis 
within P&P and LFG, but probably provides evidence against an HPSG 
SVO analysis. 
  
 
4.2. Negation 
 
We looked in 3.1 at contrasts between simple VSO clauses on the one hand 
and i-clauses and gwneud clauses on the other with respect to negation. This 
is a complex area, but it seems that there may be real problems for some 
SVO analyses here. 
 We noted in 3.1 that an i-clause is negated not by ddim but by the 
defective verb peidio. As discussed in Borsley and Jones (in press), ddim only 
appears immediately after the subject of a finite clause or as a premodifier of 
certain predicative expressions. The latter use is illustrated by (62). 
 
(62) Mae                 Sioned wedi   bod [ddim yn       dda] 
        be.PRES.3SG Sioned PERF be     NEG PRED good 
        ‘Sioned has been not well.’ 
 
Ddim cannot appear before a VP unless it follows the subject of finite 
clause. Thus, it cannot appear in an i-clause or in examples like the 
following: 
 
 (63)a. *Mae Gwyn yn       debyg o  ddim mynd i  Aberystwyth. 
              is     Gwyn PRED likely of NEG go      to Aberystwyth 
              ‘Gwyn is likely not to go to Aberystwyth.’ 
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                   b. *Mae Gwyn yn       awyddus i  ddim mynd i  Aberystwyth. 
              is     Gwyn PRED eager       to NEG go      to Aberystwyth 
   ‘Gwyn is eager not to go to Aberystwyth.’  
 
Rouveret (1994) assumes that the ddim is adjoined to VP. However, it looks 
as if it can only combine with the VP in a finite clause. Is this a problem? 
Within Minimalism, the answer is probably no. We noted earlier that the VP 
in which a finite verb originates will probably have tense features on 
minimalist assumptions. Hence, it should be possible to ensure that ddim 
only combines with a the VP in a finite clause. Whether there might be a 
problem within LFG is not clear to me. 
 We also noted earlier that a gwneud clause with a transitive verb can 
be negated with the adverb ddim, but a VSO sentence with a transitive verb 
cannot be. In fact a VSO sentence with a transitive verb can be negated with 
ddim as long as it is not immediately followed by the object NP. Thus, while 
(64a) is ungrammatical, (64b) is fine. 
 
(64)a. *Fytodd   hi    ddim y    siocled      hyd yn oed. 
            ate-3SG she NEG the chocolate even 
            ‘She didn’t eat the chocolate even.’ 
       b. Fytodd   hi    ddim hyd yn oed y     siocled.  
           ate-3SG she NEG even           the chocolate 
           ‘She didn’t eat the chocolate even.’ 
 
It looks, then, as if we need a constraint banning two adjacent 
elements. Such a constraint does not fit very readily with minimalist 
assumptions. Moreover, on minimalist assumptions they will not in fact be 
adjacent. This is because movement leaves a copy within Minimalism. This 
means that (32) will have the following structure assuming Rouveret’s view 
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of clause structure:  
 
(65) [AgrP welodd [TP Siôn [VP ddim [VP Siôn welodd y defaid]]]] 
 
Ddim and the object NP would be a little closer if the subject originated 
outside VP, but they would be still be separated by the copy of the verb, which 
must originate within VP. 
 What about LFG? As noted above, LFG has no traces or copies. Hence 
ddim will be adjacent to the NP in the ungrammatical examples. Perhaps, then, 
there is no problem here. There is certainly no problem either for the HPSG 
analysis in (4), since the facts can be attributed to a constraint on order 
domains (as is done in Borsley and Jones in press). 
We also noted in 3.1 that a VSO sentence with a transitive verb can 
be negated by a negative object but that a gwneud clause cannot be. Borsley 
and Jones (2000, 2001, in press) argue that the finite verb in a negative 
sentence requires a negative dependent, which may be a negative subject, 
post-subject adverb or complement. The following illustrate the three 
possibilities: 
 
(66) Does    neb      yn y    cae. 
       NEG-is no one in  the field 
       ‘There is no one in the field.’ 
(67) Dydy    Gwyn ddim yn        cysgu 
       NEG-is Gwyn NEG PROG sleep 
       ‘Gwyn is not sleeping.’ 
(68) Weles      i neb. 
        saw-1SG I no one 
       ‘I didn’t see anyone.’ 
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A negative dependent that is part of a complement is not sufficient. Thus, 
the following, where the complements are bracketed, are ungrammatical:  
 
(69) *Na’th Emrys [weld neb] 
         did     Emrys   see   no one 
         ‘Emrys didn’t see anybody.’ 
(70) *Na’th Emrys [gweithio erioed] 
         did      Emrys  work       never 
         ‘He never worked’ 
 
Borsley and Jones argue within HPSG that both post-verbal subjects and 
post-subject verbs are complements and propose a constraint requiring the 
main verb of a negative sentence to have a negative complement. It may be 
that a related constraint could be proposed within LFG. Within Minimalism, 
the natural assumption is that the negative dependent and some negative 
head undergo operation AGREE, and that this is blocked in (69) and (70) 
because they are separated by a Phase boundary. However, it is not really 
clear what sort of phase boundary there might be between the head and the 
dependent. Rouveret (1994) in fact proposes that non-finite VPs are 
embedded in a DP, and it has been suggested that DPs may be phases. 
However, a number of objections to this analysis are presented in Borsley 
(1997). Roberts (forthcoming) proposes that non-finite VPs are embedded in 
a Part(iciple) Phrase, and one might suggest that this is a phase. If there is 
evidence for a phase boundary between the negative head and the negative 
dependent, there may be no problem here. Of course, as noted earlier, if 
such sentences do have a more complex structure than VSO clauses, then 
they cannot be seen as revealing the basic structure of VSO clauses. 
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 A further type of example that is relevant here is exemplified by the 
following, where ‘%’ indicates that speakers vary in their judgements: 
 
(71) %Soniodd Sioned am      neb 
           talked     Sioned about no one  
           ‘Sioned talked about no one.’ 
 
Borsley and Jones (in press) propose that prepositions have the same value 
for the feature NEG as their complements for some speakers but not others. 
Thus, the PP is a negative complement for some speakers but not others. 
Within a minimalist analysis, there is no problem with speakers who accept 
such examples. There is a problem, however, with speakers who reject 
them. PPs are not normally considered to be phases. Hence one would not 
expect AGREE to be blocked by a PP boundary. On the face if it, then, the 
fact that some speakers reject such examples is problematic for minimalist 
assumptions. 
 
 
4.3. Mutation 
 
We can turn now to relevant another area of Welsh grammar, the area of 
mutation. We will see that some instances of mutation appear to pose a 
problem for an SVO analysis. 
 The term mutation refers to systems of word-initial consonant 
alternations. Three types of mutation are traditionally identified in Welsh, soft 
mutation, aspirate mutation and nasal mutation. By far the most common is 
soft mutation, which involves the following changes: 
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 (72) Soft mutation 
  p > b   b > f([v])  m > f([v]) 
  t > d   d > dd([ð])  ll [ ] > l 
  c([k]) > g  g > ∅   rh[rh] > r 
 
Soft mutation is triggered by a variety of lexical items. The following 
illustrate:  
 
(73) dau fachgen     (bachgen) 
        two boy 
       ‘two boys’ 
(74) Aeth Megan i   Fangor.   (Bangor) 
       went  Megan to Bangor 
       ‘Megan went to Bangor.’ 
(75) Mae Gwyn yn        feddyg.   (meddyg) 
       is       Gwyn PRED doctor 
       ‘Gwyn is a doctor.’ 
 
In (73), the mutation is triggered by the numeral dau. In (74), it is triggered 
by the preposition i ‘to’. Finally, in (75), the trigger is the predicative 
particle yn. Most instances of soft mutation can be seen as triggered by a 
specific lexical item or class of lexical items, but there are a variety of cases 
where such an analysis seems impossible. A number of researchers have 
argued that soft mutation is triggered by an immediately preceding NP 
(Harlow 1989, Borsley and Tallerman 1996 and Borsley 1999, Tallerman 
2003).17 This accounts inter alia for the mutation of post-subject 
constituents such as the non-finite VP in (76). 
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(76) Dw i ’n         disgwyl i   Mair fynd i   Aberystwyth. (mynd) 
       am  I  PROG expect   to Mair go    to Aberystwyth 
       ‘I expect Mair to go to Aberystwyth.’ 
 
It should also account for the mutation of the object in (77). 
 
(77) Welodd Emrys ddraig.  (draig) 
         saw       Emrys dragon 
         ‘Emrys saw a dragon.’ 
 
However, as Tallerman (1990) points out, on a transformational SVO 
analysis, the subject in (77) is immediately followed not by the object but by 
a verbal trace or a verbal copy in more recent work. On the latter view, (80) 
will have the following superficial structure: 
 
(78) [AgrP welodd [TP Emrys [VP Emrys gwelodd ddafad]]] 
 
Mutation must apply after deletion of the lower instances of Emrys and 
gwelodd. However, it seems that a copy left by wh-movement must be 
deleted after mutation. We have examples like the following: 
 
(79) Pwy welodd ddraig?  (draig) 
         who saw       dragon 
         ‘Who saw a dragon?’ 
 
Here, the object is mutated just as it is in (77). It seems, then, that a copy of 
pwy must remain in post-verbal position when mutation applies. It looks, 
then, as if deletion of some copies must precede mutation and deletion of 
others follow. There is an obvious alternative: to assume that the first set of 
copies do not exist. But given current transformational assumptions, this 
means abandoning the assumption that verbs originate in a post-subject 
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position. Thus, mutation seems to pose a problem for a transformational 
SVO analysis. There is no problem for an LFG VSO analysis given that it 
has no traces or copies. There is also no problem either for the HPSG analysis 
in (4), since the mutation rule can refer to order domains, as in Borsley (1999, 
2003). 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The preceding discussion suggests that at least some SVO analyses of 
Welsh VSO clauses may face some problems. In particular, minimalist SVO 
analyses seem to face problems because of the assumption that movement 
leaves a copy. However, this is not really too important. As we noted at the 
outset, other things being equal, an SVO analysis is more complex than a 
non-SVO analysis. Thus, the burden of proof is on advocates of an SVO 
analysis. In section 3 I looked at the arguments that have been advanced or 
might be advanced for an SVO analysis. I argued that none of them is very 
compelling. If this is right, it is reasonable to assume a non-SVO analysis 
and to reject ‘the general consensus of work on Welsh’. As noted at the 
outset, Culicover and Jackendoff (forthcoming) argue at length against 
analyses in which the superficial word order of clauses is the result of 
movement. The argument developed here provides some support for their 
position. Thus, it is not just relevant to Welsh. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at at the 10th Welsh Syntax 
Seminar at Gregynog, Wales in July 2002, at the Linguistics Society of 
Korea workshop on inversion in Seoul, Korea in August 2002, at the 
Autumn Meeting of the Linguistics Association of Great Britain at the 
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UMIST in September 2002, and at a seminar in Université Paris 7 in 
February 2003. I am grateful to members of the audiences for various helpful 
comments. Any bad bits are my responsibility. 
2 Roberts (forthcoming) proposes a slightly more complex analysis with 
separate Pers(on) and Num(ber) heads instead of Rouveret’s Agr head. 
3 However, Bresnan (personal communication) informs me that such an 
analysis is not necessary within LFG assumptions. 
4 For some critical discussion of the arguments for a restriction to binary 
branching see Culicover and Jackendoff (in preparation, chapter 3). 
5 The analysis in (6) has been applied in English auxiliary-initial clauses in 
Sag and Wasow (1999) and Warner (2000).  
6 Interestingly, Carnie (2001) proposes an LFG analysis of Irish VSO 
clauses in which they have a flat structure. Presumably, then, he no longer 
agrees with his suggestion.  
7 Various analyses have been proposed for ddim. For Rouveret (1991) it 
occupies Spec NegP. For Rouveret (1994) it is adjoined to VP. Borsley and 
Jones (2000, 2001, in press) argue that it is an extra complement of the 
preceding finite verb. 
8 It would not, however, be the only possible explanation. An alternative 
would be that the verbs have almost identical categories in the various 
sentence types. 
9 The idea that SVO clauses involve a VSO structure was developed in 
connection with English in McCawley (1970). 
10 The situation is actually more complex than this, as we will see in 4.2. 
11 The examples in (34) can be turned into grammatical sentences by the 
insertion of ddim after the subject to give the following: 
(i)a. Naeth Siôn ddim gweld neb. 
       did      Siôn NEG see   no one 
       ‘Siôn did not see anyone.’ 
   b. Naeth Siôn ddim gweld dim   o  ’r     defaid. 
       did      Siôn NEG see     NEG of  the sheep 
       ‘Siôn did not see the sheep.’ 
12 It is also rejected in some work within P&P, notably Williams (1994: 
182-184). 
13 Rouveret in fact assumes that the construction involves a coordination not 
of VPs but of TPs. As far as I can see, this does not have any advantages. 
14 For a detailed LFG analysis of the construction, embodying the 
assumption that it involve coordination of a clause and a VP, see Sadler 
(2003). 
15 In examples like these where the verb in elliptical is something other than 
gwneud, the same verb must appear in the first clause. Thus, the following is 
ungrammatical: 
(i) *Brynodd Emrys geffyl a     gwerthodd Megan. 
       bought    Emrys horse  and sold           Megan 
       ‘Emrys bought a horse and Megan sold one.’ 
This is not surprising on a transformational SVO analysis since it is 
assumed that movement leaves behind a copy. On this assumption that two 
VPs in (i) will not be identical and consequently ellipsis will be precluded. 
We will see, below, however, that the assumption that movement of a verb 
leaves behind a copy causes serious problems.  
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16 Within P&P, an English example like Kim admires Lee, in which a lexical 
verb shows agreement, must involve Agr-lowering or something similar 
given that there is no evidence that the verb is outside VP. 
17 Roberts (forthcoming) argues that this mutation is in fact a realization of 
accusative case. Tallerman (2003) argues at length against this proposal. 
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This article explores a number of points at which Relevance Theory makes a 
useful contribution to second language theoretical models, specifically those 
of Bialystok and Schmidt and their respective notions of ‘analysis’, ‘control’ 
and ‘noticing’. It is suggested that the inferential mechanisms of Relevance 
Theory can account for the contingencies of communicative interaction 
without which pragmatic negotiations do not make sense, and thus can 
complement such information-processing accounts through the notions of 
‘manifestness’ and the balance between ‘effort’ and ‘effect’. Further 
research is called for into the integration of information-processing concepts 
and Relevance Theoretical insights as part of a complex theoretical 
architecture capable of capturing the rich diversity of pragmatic 
development in second language acquisition. 
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1. Introduction 
 
If Relevance Theory is an appropriate theoretical perspective for 
understanding the pragmatics of second language learning, there are two 
requirements which it should strive to meet. The first, and  weaker, is that it 
should be able to account for the robust facts of interlanguage pragmatics 
(ILP), such as contextual variation, nature of development and relationship 
with input. The second, stronger requirement is that it should be able to 
provide insightful explanations for data which have not adequately been 
accounted for before, and=or better explanations for data which already 
have an account elsewhere (Foster-Cohen, 2000). Given that ILP studies 
have moved in recent years from a rather descriptive to a more explanatory 
level of development, it is time to engage with a range of theories as 
constitutive elements of ILP studies. This article contributes to the 
discussion of the usefulness of Relevance Theory for second language 
research by comparing Relevance Theory with other cognitive approaches 
to second language, specifically information processing models. 
 
 
2. Cognitive Theories of Pragmatic Development in a Second Language 
 
Examining the explanatory power of RT requires careful selection of the 
approaches with which it is to be compared. Descriptive accounts of second 
language pragmatics that do not attempt explanation are not appropriate 
candidates. We mean by this that accounts which place their focus on the 
pragmatic performance of learners, establishing comparisons between 
languages and cultures (e.g., studies in cross-cultural pragmatics) do not 
have the same goals as Relevance Theory, namely to offer an integrated 
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perspective on bold communication and cognition. Thus, it would be unfair 
to assume that their frameworks are translatable into each other. In this way, 
accounts which, while attempting explanation, pay no heed to cognitive 
dimensions of language use and language learning would also not be 
appropriate. However, theories which attempt to explain the inner workings 
of the learner mind are indeed appropriate interlocutors.  
Both Bialystok’s (1993) two-dimensional model of second language 
proficiency development and Schmidt’s noticing hypothesis (1993) are 
appropriate interlocutors in this sense. The discussion below assumes basic 
familiarity with all three theories, and only addresses points of contact 
between them. (For a more detailed discussion of the connections across the 
three theories, see de Paiva, 2003.) 
Bialystok’s account of pragmatic development rests on distinctions 
between conceptual, formal and symbolic mental representations. 
Conceptual representations are organized around meanings, formal 
representations are coded in terms of the structure of the language and refer 
to metalinguistic knowledge, and, finally, symbolic representations express 
the way in which  language refers, coding between form and a referent. In 
Bialystok’s view, pragmatic competence depends to a greater extent on 
symbolic representations and to a lesser extent on formal representations. 
However, she argues that the mapping is not between form and meaning, 
but rather between form and social context (Bialystok, 1993). 
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2.1 Context 
 
The notion of context is key to any dynamic account of pragmatics, 
including Relevance Theory. However, where Bialystok has a very general 
notion of context which (like the context of the sociocultural approaches to 
pragmatics), seems to be external to the learner (see Foster-Cohen, this 
issue), under Relevance Theory context is explicitly defined as internal to 
the learner (because it is cognitive context) and is explicitly defined as the 
set of assumptions the hearer brings to the interpretation of any ostensive 
communication. Thus, whereas Bialystok steps out of her cognitive account 
in order to account for pragmatics, Relevance Theory maintains the 
cognitive stance, incorporating external notions of context such as place, 
situation, etc., but, crucially, through an internal context, that is the eyes of 
=via the mind of the speaker= hearer. The fact that Relevance Theory in this 
way makes stronger cognitive claims for pragmatics means a shift from a 
view where social and cultural aspects of interactions represent central 
constraints to a more agent-based perspective with a clear emphasis on the 
individual’s internal context. 
It is worth noting at this point that while, as we are arguing, 
Relevance Theory can do the job of accounting for the notion of context 
used by sociocultural theories, it must be acknowledged that Relevance 
Theory has traditionally not taken on board the need to address explicit 
cultural knowledge of how to behave and how to interpret utterances in a 
culturally bound way (but see Foster-Cohen, this issue). In the specific case 
of ILP, it seems that Relevance Theory may profit from incorporating 
notions made explicit by Bialystok in order to account for what happens for 
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learners of a second language when they are confronted with contexts in 
which their utterances are displaced from their original context. Here, 
Bialystok provides a way of describing how declarative or propositional 
assumptions about cultural context can be formed and brought to bear in 
displaced contexts. She suggests learners construct their pragmatic 
knowledge by building a symbolic representation level, relating form to 
(external) context, from an already existing level of formal representations. 
And in order to learn culturally conventionalized forms and rules for 
pragmatic language use, learners need to analyse existing knowledge by 
creating new explicit categories and learning new forms. Bialystok’s notion 
of ‘analysis’ (contrasted with ‘control’ in her model) offers a way of 
understanding how (Relevance Theoretic) assumptions become incorporated 
into the mind of the speaker=hearer. 
However, neither theory adequately addresses how analysis of 
pragmatic (as opposed to grammatical) input works exactly, nor how the 
‘control’ mechanisms for the new representations develop. How is it, in 
Relevance Theoretical terms, that some assumptions for interpretation come 
instantly to the fore, and are instantly and fully ‘manifest’ and others are 
more reticent or harder to bring to bear on a particular act of 
interpretation=comprehension? 
An appropriate contribution can perhaps be made here by Schmidt’s 
noticing hypothesis. The concept of ‘noticing’ refers to the allocation of 
attention to some stimulus as a prerequisite for learning. ‘Attention’ is a 
necessary condition for noticing, but not attention to input in general, rather 
to linguistic forms, functional meanings and relevant contextual features 
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(Schmidt, 1993). The issue of how learners decide to attend to form, rather 
than to communicative intention, in understanding has been addressed by 
Carroll (2001) who, like us, argues that it will be relevance (in the 
Relevance Theory sense) that will determine what exactly is attended to, 
and therefore what is noticed. The extension needs only to be made from 
vagueness in grammatical input to vagueness in pragmatic input. 
Schmidt argues that aspects of pragmatic knowledge which appear to be 
unconscious or implicitly learned might be better accounted for by 
connectionist models since, according to his account, principles of 
pragmatics and discourse are better represented in terms of associative 
networks, rather than by propositional rules. While learners do not need 
consciously to count the frequency of occurrence of contextual and 
pragmatic features, they might have to notice specific relevant 
pragmalinguistic or contextual features in order for the encoding to be 
triggered. Again, the selection of features seems to play an important role. 
Nevertheless, Schmidt does not explain the criteria according to 
which a specific feature is considered relevant. If the acquisition of 
pragmatic competence is a question of selecting information amidst an input 
of grammatical, textual, discoursal and social factors, then a notion such as 
‘manifestness’ in Relevance Theory has a clear contribution to make. 
‘Manifestness’ seems to relate in a less prescriptive way to the 
notion of ‘representation’ than the concept of ‘analysis’ in Bialystok’s 
model discussed above, since what is ‘manifest’ to the learner is what he or 
she is capable of representing. In this sense, ‘manifestness’ is a more 
dynamic and flexible concept which can account better for constraints on 
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particular interactions. By the same token, the concept of ‘control’ is too 
static a category because its emphasis on automatic processes potentially 
renders it insensitive to the dynamics of pragmatic interactions. In other 
words, ‘control’ describes a state rather than the process by which 
experiences in interactions are converted into explicit and implicit 
assumptions by learners. To capture this flexibility, the mechanism of 
‘control’ needs to be expanded to include an understanding of how it works, 
and how it builds cognitive context. As Schmidt (1992) has argued, it is not 
enough to claim that control develops with experience in its own course; 
rather, it has to be explained in terms of learning mechanisms. Control, then, 
needs to connect  with theories of learning. 
 
 
2.2 Relevance  
 
From a Relevance Theory perspective, it can only be that inferencing forms 
the basis of pragmatic development, and since inferencing produces sudden 
insights, it is likely that the development of assumptions and of control is 
not a gradual cumulative process (Bialystok, 1994: 161), but one with 
sudden and major leaps forward. Also, inferencing is always done from 
background assumptions as premises, so if, as Bialystok argues, control 
depends on the language task required in a specific situation, then control 
must be construed contingently (as part of the ongoing dynamic of 
interaction), rather than statically as Bialystok seems to suggest. In fact, we 
suggest that the concept of processing for relevance can offer theoretical 
insights which go beyond the concepts of ‘analysis’ and ‘control’ in 
Bialystok’s model. Relevance Theory would predict that when a learner 
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attempts to process an utterance in the new language, assumptions that have 
been accessed frequently before (notably in a first language context of 
interaction expectations), come into the cognitive context very quickly (are 
easily manifest) and may provide a partial interpretation (see Ross, 1997; 
Liszka, this issue). A typical example in second language pragmatics would 
be when a second language learner seeks to transfer pragmatic codes and 
conventions of politeness from a first language learning context into a 
displaced (second language) context. A learner recognizing that part of an 
utterance he or she does not understand is relevant to understanding the 
whole utterance will invest the effort to either search more deeply in explicit 
knowledge of the language or make inferences from the context of utterance 
(mentally represented) as to what the whole communication might mean, 
and thereby provide a (probably partially) correct analysis which allows 
him=her to stop processing because a sufficiently relevant interpretation will 
have been found. 
A learner’s willingness to invest more effort in inferencing processes 
tends to be driven by the desire for strong communication since explicitness 
can be assumed to offset other uncertainties of second language 
communication. The distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ 
communication in Sperber and Wilson’s terms is crucial here. Strong 
communication aims at conveying specific assumptions, while weak 
communication aims to steer a hearer’s thoughts in a particular direction and 
is deliberately vague. 
Non-native speakers may not only weakly interpret both the weakly 
and strongly communicative utterances of others, but may also deliberately 
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exploit the distinction in order to give preference to pragmatic 
appropriateness at the expense of linguistic precision. Thus a non-native 
speaker might prioritize the quest for maximum effect and minimum effort 
by violating discoursal norms and undermining pragmatic conventions. 
Alternatively, he or she may prioritize certain pragmatic conventions, such 
as being explicit, thus losing effect and increasing effort. The result would 
be that there is more information to be processed and much of it would be 
pragmatically unnecessary from a native-speaker point of view. An 
argument for an account along these lines of what Edmondson and House 
(1991) have described as second language speaker ‘waffling’ can be found 
in Foster-Cohen (2002). 
 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
Whereas information-processing concepts of ‘analysis’, ‘control’ and 
‘noticing’ are held to offer plausible insights into learning, they reach their 
limitations when it comes to a discussion of the process-like contingencies 
of communicative interaction without which pragmatic negotiations do not 
make sense. Here, a Relevance Theoretical framework can complement 
informationprocessing accounts by offering a plausible theory of cognition 
and communication which operates with a notion of internal context 
(manifestness and the effort=effect balance) where inferencing processes are 
central. This approach to context, however, still needs to employ the 
dynamic notions of ‘noticing’ and ‘analysis’ in order to shed light on the 
ways in which learners develop and use assumptions on-line in pragmatic 
contexts which are by definition displaced. A future programme for SLA 
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research into the acquisition of pragmatic abilities in a second language 
could thus be said to lie in an integration of useful information-processing 
concepts and Relevance Theoretical insights as part of a complex theoretical 
architecture capable of capturing the rich diversity of pragmatic 
development in second language acquisition.  
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The polarisation of the experimental and observational 
traditions in linguistics has tended to obscure the common 
origins of both in intuitions. In this article I explore one form 
of observational work – conversation analysis – by examining 
its perceived limitations and the reasons for its insistence on 
recorded interactions. Its capacity to capture the temporal 
production and interpretation of utterances is what makes for 
its distinctive contribution to linguistics, allowing us to 
discover order in the organisation of talk that escapes 
introspection. The analysis of data extracts and the 
examination of case studies impels us to recognise what the 
investigation of single utterances and utterance pairs cannot: 
the importance of sequential placement to the understanding of 
utterances and the centrality of action in language use. 
 
 
Introduction: “Order at all points” 
 
Informal experiments by means of the investigation of intuitions (Chomsky, 
1986) have become as natural a part of linguistic inquiry as their more 
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formal counterparts in physics and biology. In the physical sciences the 
experimental tradition has progressed alongside one which is anchored in 
the observational and which is allied to the technological advances of the 
day: after all, before the advent of the electron microscope and the ultra-
centrifuge, it was not possible to consider questions about the sub-cellular 
structure of cells; without gravitational lens telescopes, astrophysicists 
would not be forced to rethink theories about the formation of planetary 
systems. In the study of language the experimental and the observational 
have, of course, taken more divergent paths (see also Meurers, this volume). 
There are varied reasons for this. Prominent among them is the view of 
many that the investigation of intuitions, albeit in some respects 
unsatisfactory, is the only means by which to overcome the perceived 
limitations of a reliance on samples of actual language use. As Borsley and 
Ingham (2002:5) note, if one wants to know if a language allows parasitic 
gaps within subjects, nothing is to be gained by attempting to search for 
naturally-occurring examples when one can more easily and fruitfully 
simply elicit acceptability judgements from a native speaker. Allied to this 
may be a reaction against a perceived “fetishism of tape per se” (Schegloff 
et al, 1996:18) and what may be seen as a view that discounts data which is 
not tape-recorded as a valid object of investigation. The divergence, even 
polarisation, of methods has tended to obscure the fact that the one builds on 
the other: what we observe is always initially guided by intuition. And, far 
from adhering to the impossible dream that is pure induction, observation is 
as much driven by specific assumptions as methods relying on introspection. 
It is the nature of those assumptions that I here explore in examining one 
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type of work grounded in the observational: conversation analysis (CA2). I 
consider both the apparent limitations of naturally-occurring, tape-recorded 
interaction, as noted above, and the reasons for the insistence on recorded 
interactions and its corollary, a perceived dismissal of other forms of data.  
In doing so, I shall propose that what makes this approach distinctive 
in its treatment of naturally-occurring, recorded material is precisely that 
which makes it of interest to linguistics: what is made possible by capturing 
the temporal production and interpretation of utterances in the particular 
form of transcription3 which has been adopted in this work. The temporality 
is made manifest not just in the transcription of pauses and overlaps but also 
crucially, as we shall see, in capturing the sequential context of the object of 
investigation; the context in which it is produced and the context which it 
reproduces. It is in the inclusion of the temporal dimension, the moment-by-
moment construction of utterances, that we have this work’s most valuable 
contribution to the study of language, rather than any a priori investment in 
recording as such. 
The decision to take interaction as the source of data rests on the 
central assumption that:  
 
“…whatever humans do can be examined to discover 
some way they do it, and that way will be stably 
describable. That is, we may alternatively take it that 
there is order at all points” (Sacks, 1984: 22; italics 
added). 
 
From the perspective of theoretical linguistics, this privileging of the way 
humans do things, rather than why – the emphasis on description, rather 
than explanation – must seem unsatisfactory. However, attempting to 
establish why people do what they do is surely not feasible without first 
55 
identifying the resources people use to do it: any ‘why’ is ultimately 
inextricable from the ‘how’. 
If, then, various kinds of experimentation consists in imposing order 
on language – stripping it of the so-called ‘errors’ (including hesitation and 
dysfluency) that are commonly held to attend its production – the use of 
naturally-occurring interaction, and, crucially, its transcription,4 renders 
possible the discovery of order in language. It does so by recording and thus 
making available for analysis that which experimentation deletes – and, in 
so doing, capturing domains of organization otherwise undetectable in the 
apparent disorder and fragmentation of interaction. 
I start by considering what may be gained from analysis that may 
add to our intuitive sense of what certain linguistic items are doing. Through 
case studies and the analysis of an extended sequence of interaction, I then 
go on to examine how and why this form of work uses the participants’ own 
displayed understandings at the centre of the analysis; the units of analysis 
are taken to be those that the participants themselves are observed to be 
using. An important methodological upshot of this is that the scope of 
inquiry is paradoxically broader in many ways than introspection makes 
possible. 
 
 
1. Introspection and beyond 
 
“Recurrently, what stands as a solution to some problem 
emerges from unmotivated examination of some piece of 
data, where, had we started out with a specific interest in 
the problem, it would not have been supposed, in the first 
instance that this piece of data was a resource with which 
to consider, and come up with a solution for, that 
particular problem”  (Sacks, 1984:27). 
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Sacks’s reference to ‘unmotivated looking’ must naturally be seen in the 
light of the earlier assumption that he makes: that of ‘order at all points’. 
Thus in setting aside specific hypotheses (about, say, parasitic gaps), it is 
possible to investigate the methods by which speakers come to do what they 
do. Of course, the investigation itself is shaped in the first instance by 
intuition. Any analysis of naturally-occurring interactional data has to 
develop a sense of what the particular linguistic item (at any level – lexical, 
syntactic, prosodic, etc.) under investigation achieves, and the use of 
intuition is critical in establishing this. For it is intuition, after all, which 
initially guides us in the selection of data and plays an important role in 
assessing how what is said is selected from a possible set of alternatives. In 
general those alternatives have to be intuited in the process of considering 
how what is said is designed. Reliance on intuition alone, however, risks 
leaving out of account what for participants is a critical resource for 
establishing what a given item is doing: its sequential context – what it 
follows and what, in turn, follows it. Consider in the first instance the 
simple example of the following utterance5:  
 
‘Don’t’.  
 
Intuitively, we are likely to characterise this in pragmatic terms as a 
directive. Lacking a prior context to which this might be in some way a 
response, we are led to stipulate the meaning or function of the utterance by 
importing a context to which ‘don’t’ is fitted; inuitively, then, it may be 
taken to be directed to stopping or preventing someone from doing 
something. It is, for example, what an adult might say to a child in the 
interests of restraint; so may wider elements of context be assumed in order 
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to build a plausible characterisation. In putting this particular ‘don’t’ back 
into the context  in which it occurred, however, we can see that the 
participants’ own understandings of ‘don’t’ are somewhat at odds with the 
intuitive reading: 
 
(1) (D=David, adolescent client; T=Therapist; from Parker, 20016) 
 
1D I always behave in all of them but (0.3) in=English and Maths and  
2 Science and French (.) I can’t. 
3 (1.3) 
4T→ Don’t. 
5 (0.8) 
6D Mm. 
7 (0.5) 
8T Say to yourself (0.8) [it’s not that I can’t, it’s that I don’t. 
9D             [Mm 
10 (0.9) 
11D Mmm 
12 (0.5) 
13T oOka:yo, 
14 (1.8) 
15T If you can’t (0.8) you lose control, if you don’t you’re in  
16 control. 
 
It is quite clear from David’s assenting ‘Mm’ in l.6 that what he understands 
the therapist to be doing is not issuing a directive but rather proposing a 
substitute for his assertion (‘…I can’t’) in l.2.7 This is evident from the 
therapist’s subsequent turn at l.8, where she incorporates both what David 
had said at l.2 – ‘I can’t’ – and her own ‘Don’t’ at l.4, explicitly 
counterposing the two. David’s subsequent acceptance of that, at l.11, 
reiterates his earlier assent. Of course, the understanding of ‘don’t’ as such 
is highly dependent on the postpositioning of David’s ‘I can’t’ – held off till 
the last possible point in the turn. The therapist, in other words, uses 
David’s ‘I can’t’ in l.2 as a resource with which to build, in a form of 
‘syntactic parasitism’ (the phrase is from Heritage and Sorjonen, 1994), her 
own turn.  
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There are important methodological and theoretical implications of an 
approach which considers an utterance in its sequential context, as in the 
example above. It is, in the first place, methodologically transparent, such 
that any analysis is open to dispute by being grounded in the data – or a 
representation of them8 – which is presented with it. And, for all the breadth 
of scope that introspection seems to afford, there is the risk that 
introspection may be limited by consensus: however wide-ranging the 
imagination, its products are always going to be constrained by what 
audiences will accept as plausible (see Sacks, 1992b: 419-20). As Sacks 
notes:  
 
“a base for using close looking at the world for 
theorizing about it is that from close looking at the world 
you can find things that we couldn’t, by imagination, 
assert were there: one wouldn’t know that they were 
typical, one might not know they ever happened, and 
even if one supposed that they did one couldn’t say it 
because an audience wouldn’t believe it” (Sacks, 
1992b:420; also quoted in Schegloff, 1996a:167). 
 
The theoretical implications follow from the methodological practice of 
making available both prior and subsequent turns along with the target 
utterance. For it is this which reveals that sequential positioning – the 
placement of a turn after something (including, of course, as we shall see, 
silence) – is seen to be a crucial resource for participants in making sense of 
what is said. In (1), then, an intuitive sense of the meaning of an item is 
transformed by understanding it with respect to where it is placed in an 
interactional sequence: sequential placement, rather than form per se, is 
seen to be criterial in what will be made of it.  
 
 
59 
2. The primacy of sequential placement 
 
Perhaps the simplest demonstration of this orientation to placement is the 
response to an utterance which clearly prefigures something else: ‘guess 
what’ standardly receives the response ‘what’ – a ‘go-ahead’ to tell – and 
not, as might be predicted from its form, a guess. In the same way, ‘have 
you got a moment’ routinely adumbrates some kind of claim on our time; 
and similarly: 
 
(2) (from Schegloff, 1995a:24; Ju=Judy; Jo=John) 
 
1Ju Hi John. 
2Jo Ha you doin-<say what ’r you doing. 
3Ju→ Well, we’re going out. Why. 
4Jo Oh, I was just gonna say come out and come over here and talk  
5 this evening, [but if you’re going out you can’t very well do  
6 that. 
7Ju          [“Talk”, you mean get drunk, don’t you? 
 
(3) (from Terasaki, 1976:28; D=Deliverer; R=Recipient) 
 
1D Didju hear the terrible news? 
2R→ No. What. 
3D Y’know your Grandpa Bill’s brother Dan? 
4R He died. 
6D Yeah.  
 
Following the response to the question in each case,9 the speaker at the 
arrowed turn clearly orients to what the first turn had projected, in (2) with 
‘Why’ at l.3, and in  (3) with ‘What’ at l.2. What the first turn had projected 
is of course a further contingent action: an invitation in (2) (where John’s 
report of what it was going to be endorses Judy’s understanding of l.2 as 
indeed its foreshadowing), and a news announcement in (3). Participants’ 
responses to ‘guess what’, ‘have you got a moment’, ‘what are you doing’, 
and ‘did you hear the terrible/wonderful news…’ and their variants thus 
systematically display their understandings of these utterances as having a 
prefatory status: they are not treated, in and of themselves, as accomplishing 
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the actions (announcements, requests, invitations, etc.) to which they are 
preliminaries. The example of ‘pre’s’, as they have come to be termed (see 
Schegloff, 1995a)10, demonstrates in a very straightforward way why 
consideration of isolated utterances, rather than as embedded in sequences 
of talk, misses a basic feature of language use: its action projection.11 
 
 
3. Language as Action 
 
Attention to sequences of interaction is thus able to reveal what isolated 
utterances cannot: the trajectory of actions. Not only subsequent turns but 
also prior ones may be needed to establish the action being launched by an 
utterance. A particularly dramatic instance of this is Schegloff’s (1996a) 
study of repetitions12 by one speaker of another speaker’s prior turn:  
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(4) (from Schegloff, 1996a:183. Interview with Susan Shreve on U.S. 
National Public Radio concerning her recent novel. E=Bob Edwards, 
interviewer; S=Susan Shreve) 
 
1E Why do you write juvenile books. 
2 (0.5) 
3E [’s that- b-  (0.?)  [hav]ing [children?   ] 
4S [Because I love child[ren].   [I really do:]= 
5 =.hh I enjoy children:, .hh I started writing: (.) 
6 juvenile books fer entirely pra:ctical reasons, .hh 
7 (.) 
8S [u- u- 
9E [Making money::. 
10S→ Making [money 
11E   [yes ((+laughter)) 
12S that- that practical reason hhh 
13 (.) 
14S I’ve been writing juvenile books for a lo:ng.. 
 
(5) (from Schegloff, 1996a:174. E=Evelyn; R=Rita. Evelyn has been called 
to the phone) 
 
1E =Hi: Rita 
2R Hi: Evelyn:. How [are y’ 
3E        [I hadda come in another room. 
4R Oh:. Uh huh.= 
5E =I fee:l a bi:ssel verschickert. 
6 (0.2) 
7R W- why’s ’a:t, 
8 (0.4) 
9R uh you’ve had sump’n t’drink.= 
10E→ =I had sump’n t’dri:nk. 
11R Uh huh. 
 
From a strictly informational perspective there could be nothing more 
redundant than the exact repetition of what another has just said; but 
Schegloff’s analysis reveals these repetitions to be instances of a distinct 
and hitherto undescribed action. The practice of agreeing with another by 
repeating what they have just said is shown to constitute the action of 
confirming an allusion; that is, confirming both its content as well as 
confirming its prior inexplicit conveyance. Thus in (4) the interviewer 
formulates his understanding of ‘entirely practical reasons’ as an allusion to 
making money, in his next turn; Shreve’s repetition of this in confirmation 
serves also to confirm that ‘practical reasons’ was indeed an allusion – 
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something she makes explicit (‘that practical reason’) in l.12. Similarly with 
(5), Evelyn’s ‘I had sump’n t’drink’, notwithstanding the deictic shift 
indexing the change of speaker, confirms both Rita’s proffered 
understanding in l.9 ‘you’ve had sump’n t’drink’, of why Evelyn feels ‘a 
bissel vershickert’ (‘a little tipsy’) and also that this was inferrable from her 
own prior talk. While neither the scope nor the subtlety of Schegloff’s 
account can be conveyed here, the methodological upshot is clear: that such 
an analysis would have been impossible without data which captured the 
sequences in which these particular analytic objects are embedded, and with 
them the trajectory of the actions being implemented. In addition, the 
analysis itself is grounded in several exemplars of the same phenomenon to 
show that the findings are not idiosyncratic to particular episodes of 
interaction, but a systematic practice. It is only the identification of 
ostensibly the ‘same’ practice across a range of examples that makes it 
possible to specify ‘environments of relevant possible occurrence’ 
(Schegloff, 1993:104). Thus an integral part of the evidence that Schegloff 
adduces for his account are a case of avoidance – an observable withholding 
of the practice – and a case of relevant non-occurrence. Of these two 
‘exceptions that prove the rule’, Schegloff remarks that: 
 
“...it is virtually certain that nothing of interest would 
have been seen at all were we not already familiar with 
the practice of confirming allusions and its environments 
of possible occurrence. Here then we may have some of 
the most distinctive fruits of inquiry in rendering what 
would otherwise be invisible visible in its very absence” 
(1996a:199). 
 
It is thus in the strong empirical skewing from a cumulation of cases that we 
find normative orientations from which speakers make their own choices. 
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Significant divergences from those norms are thus hearable as such. It is in 
the collection of such cases that we can really see what it is to talk of ‘the 
same context’ or to talk meaningfully of something being ‘absent’. 
The theoretical implications of such work are equally clear: that 
phenomena which have fitted uncomfortably, if at all, into standard 
linguistic accounts because of their propositional redundancy and thus been 
dismissed as convention, formulaic, or phatic, are revealed, when 
considered in their sequential contexts, to be prosecuting courses of action. 
Thus the apparent redundancy, even apparent literal fatuousness, of an 
utterance such as ‘you’ve had your hair cut’ invites analysis for the range of 
responses as an action – as a noticing – it next makes relevant,13 and what its 
placement is designed to accomplish. Interactional noticings – that is, 
articulated noticings (to be distinguished from cognitive ones14) are clearly 
oriented to by participants as initiating talk to a proposed topic such that 
minimal responses (‘Mm’, say, or simply ‘yes’/’no’) are hearably evasive 
and rejecting of the topic proposed.15 They are, then, distinct actions, with 
their own sequential organization, oriented to as such by participants. 
The availability of the linguistic context from which an utterance 
emerges and that which it reproduces makes it possible to establish the 
interactional motivations for phenomena which, from a strictly logical and 
informational perspective, are problematic. These include contradiction (as 
in extract 1:‘I always behave in all of them, but in English and Science and 
Maths and French I can’t’), indirectness, idiomaticity and falsehood. So, for 
example, work on so-called ‘extreme case formulations’ such as ‘all’, 
‘none’, ‘always’, ‘never’, ‘everyone’, ‘no-one’, etc. has shown that in talk 
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these are routinely accepted and unchallenged;  Pomerantz (1986) initially 
identified their common use in complaints and justifications and proposed 
that they are used in a persuasive capacity to defend potential challenges to 
the legitimacy of the complaints or justifications of which they form a part. 
Further investigation has shown how their very extremity makes them 
hearable16 as potentially non-literal and thus not simply as descriptive 
universalizations of logical statements, but also as indexical of the speaker’s 
stance towards those descriptions. They thus lend themselves to a range of 
interactional practices – as well as complaining, ironizing, teasing, and so 
on (Edwards, 2000). In the same vein, work by Drew (2003) has identified 
the interactional motivations for what are revealed to be falsely exaggerated 
claims in conversation, such as the following; the arrowed turns show firstly 
the strong claim, and then a subsequent backdown by the same speaker to a 
weaker position: 
(6) (Holt 289:1-2; L=Lesley; S=Sarah. Sarah and her family have just 
returned from holiday on the Isle of Arran, which Lesley has said is her 
daughter’s favourite stamping ground) 
 
1L Well sh- the:y stay in uh various hotels and they wa::lk .hhh 
2S Oh I ↑see she’s a walker as we:ll. 
3L Yes and she’s brought me back some lovely photographs of it I  
4    really feel I know that island very well. 
5 (.) 
6S Well there’s not a lot of it to know there’s only fifty five  
7 miles of it all round [the perimeter 
8L                       [.hhh but there’s some beautiful walks  
9  aren’t the::[re 
10S→     [O:h yes (.) well we’ve done all the peaks. 
11 (0.4) 
12L Oh ye:s 
13 (0.5) 
14S A::h 
15 (0.5) 
16S→ We couldn’t do two because you need ropes and that 
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(7) (Drew:St:98; S=Sandra, B=Becky. ‘Silks’ is a nightclub) 
 
1B We were all talking about going out t- Silks tonight’cause   
2     everyone’s got the day off tomorrow? 
3S Are you- cz my house is all going t- Silks tonight?= 
4B =Really 
5S Yea:h E[mma un Ces um Ge- 
6B        [Bet it’s gonner be absolutely pa:cked though isn’t it.  
7S Yeah and Ces has been ra:iding my war:drobe. So: hh[h 
8B                                                       [.hhh Are 
9 you going. 
10S No::, 
11B ↑Why:: 
12S  I don’t know hhh hu hu .hhh I dunno it’s not really me 
13B    Mw:rh 
14S→ (      ) like it .hh I’ve never been to one yet, 
15B   You ↑HAven’t. 
16S No 
17B   Not even t’Ziggy:s 
18S→  Nope (.) I’ve bin twi- no ( ) a bin twi:ce at home to:: a place 
19  called Tu:bes which is really rubbi:sh and then I’ve been once 
20    to a place in ( ) Stamford called erm: (.) Crystals (.) which  
21  i:s o::kay: <b- n- Olivers> sorry Olivers (.) which is okay:( )  
22 but nothi:ng special, 
 
Drew’s analysis reveals how the extremity of such statements is responsive 
to the prior topic which prompted it. In response to the hearably sceptical 
uptakes that follow (such as pausing – which withholds acceptance of the 
claim, or, as in (7), an elliptical repeat, which has been shown to adumbrate 
disagreement),  their speakers produce a modified version which is 
distinctly at odds with that asserted in the first, ‘extreme’ version. Sacks 
(1975:75) had observed that one may respond ‘Fine’ to the question ‘How 
are you’ even if this is not strictly true because one is aware of the 
sequential implications of the alternative answer – which would progress 
that sequence instead of closing it down.17 Drew similarly shows how the 
truth, or otherwise, of what is said ultimately may have an interactional 
basis: 
 
 “these (over-)strong versions are fitted to the slot in 
which speakers are announcing, disagreeing, confirming, 
etc.;…we can see that speakers are dealing…with the 
exigencies which have arisen in the immediate (prior) 
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sequential environment. Speakers produce versions whch 
are fitted to their sequential moments. When the moment 
is past, so too is the ‘requirement’ for that falsely 
exaggerated version: the speaker can retreat to a ‘weaker’ 
version (just as, having answered the enquiry how are 
you? in the conventionalised ‘no problem’ fashion, a 
speaker is then free, in a subsequent slot, to say how they 
really are)” (2003:54). 
 
From a methodological perspective, sequential position is once again seen to 
be a central resource for participants; here, in establishing how far a 
description is expected to meet ‘objective’ standards of truth (Drew, 
2003:47). Those fleeting moments – often banal and apparently 
inconsequential – in which speakers’ trust in veracity becomes 
interactionally salient are surely beyond the grasp of both intuition and 
memory. It is, then, in such materials that we are compelled to confront the 
means by which speakers select among alternatives in the implementation of 
particular courses of action. Nowhere more pertinent is Wittgenstein’s 
assertion that “the aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden 
because of their simplicity and familiarity” (1953: para.129). 
 
 
4. The participant as analyst 
 
The question, then, remains of how we uncover what is hidden and make it 
accessible to analysis in the first place. Clearly there is much linguistic data 
which is tape-recorded – primarily in the sociolinguistic and discourse-
analytic tradition, as well as in much corpus linguistics – which does not use 
what to many seem to be the dense and distracting transcription conventions 
of the study of talk-in-interaction. The inclusion of inbreaths, the recording 
of silences to a tenth of a second, the precise placement of laugh particles in 
the production of talk – all, after all,  are non-linguistic phenomena. Their 
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import for linguistic analysis must ultimately be understood in the context of 
what earlier investigation in this domain set out to establish.  
The seminal work in this regard is Sacks et al’s (1974) proposal of a 
model for the turntaking organization for conversation.18 Among the many 
methodological implications of this proposal, the most radical is that it 
places, for the first time, the participants themselves analytically front-and-
centre. In doing so, it recognizes that the units with which participants 
interact are not necessarily reconcilable with units (such as the sentence or 
clause) which may be analytically imposed and by which standard they may 
be discovered to be incomplete or in some way deficient.19 Thus in (8), l.3 is 
neither sentence nor clause; but given that Mother’s turn comes right after it 
with no pause, we have evidence that she heard transparently that the other’s 
turn was complete at the conclusion of ‘At?’: 
 
(8) (From Jones and Beach, 1995; also in Schegloff, 1996b. T=Therapist, 
M=Mother) 
 
1T What kind of work do you do? 
2M Ah food service. 
3T→ At? 
4M (Uh)/(A) post office cafeteria downtown… 
 
And in the following,  Mary’s contributions can be seen to be placed with 
careful attention to points at which Adam’s talk might be possibly complete. 
In l.5 she attempts to supply the word which Adam might be seeking, just 
after he has apparently abandoned a search for a word (which, in the event, 
he does not take up); at l.17 and l.19 her agreements are placed just after the 
points at which Adam’s turn might have come to completion (at ‘interested’ 
and ‘pride’), and when it is clear that Adam’s turn is continuing at l.20 from 
l.18 she drops out after launching her turn at l.21, only to start again – this 
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time with success – at exactly the point at which Adam’s turn again might 
have come to completion (at ‘that’):  
 
(9) (C:22. A=Adam, M=Mary. Adam has just suggested that Mary might 
apply for a ‘Disabled’ sticker for her car, because of her persistent back 
pain, but acknowledges that some people might be reluctant to seek charity). 
 
01A But I think my grandmother- MY GRAndmother for example wouldn’t 
02 want anything to do with (accepting charity). 
03 (0.9) 
04A She’s actually (0.5) quite (1.2) I mean [I- I suggested she= 
05M           [Stubborn, 
06A =actually apply for disa↑bility allowance. 
07 (1) 
08A and she said  
09 (2) 
10A she was complaining about the fact that she couldn’t go anywhere,  
11 >an’< she(’d been taken away), she couldn’t afford to (---) by  
12 day, >and I said< (.) why didn’t you apply for disa↑bility  
13 allow>ance she said< (.hh) >I can’t get one of those an’ I said  
14 well do you kno::w, no she hadn’t applie:d, an’ .hh= 
15M ↑Uh huh. (Sounds like a slurred ‘I know’) 
16A =an’ she was just not interested cos [it was a QUEstion of      
       pri:de= 
17M        [↑That’s right. 
18A =for [he::r, I mean=  
19M      [Absolutely. 
20A =[I don’t understand that, [for them it’s:: 
21M  [My fath-      [My father’s sister.  
22 (0.7) 
23M The same thing. (0.4) And eventually her daughter-in-law, othey’re 
24  ↑not the best of friends anywayo, (0.6) and the daughter-in-law 
25  went- (.) went ahead she works in the Na[tional Health Service= 
26A           [an’ got it. 
27M =and got it for her.  
 
Thus, one of the ‘grossly apparent facts’ (Sacks et.al, 1974:700) about 
conversation – that overwhelmingly, one speaker speaks at at time – is 
achieved by speakers’ careful monitoring of each others’ turns for points at 
which they might be possibly complete; for the turntaking system provides 
an inherent motivation for grammatical parsing and thus for listening. So in 
Mary’s starting to talk in l.21, dropping out and starting again after ‘that’ in 
l.20 we see her analysis of ‘I don’t understand that’ as a possibly complete 
turn at that point.20 What the talk reveals, too, are the limits of individual 
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intention: at lls. 20-21, first Adam and then Mary is compelled to abandon a 
turn-in-progress, the former completely, the latter temporarily, by the 
other’s launching of a turn. It is therefore the participants’ own analyses, as 
revealed in their orientations to the interactions in which they are engaged,  
that provides the starting point for conversation analysis; it is the only 
perspective which seeks to put the analyst at the deictic centre, as it were, of 
the talk itself. It acknowledges that the exigencies of the turntaking system 
may override individual intentionality,21 exerting an interactional pressure, 
like a closing door (Schegloff,  2001) that the speaker – with grammatical 
resources – has to keep open; those grammatical resources are quite clearly 
shaped accordingly. Analysis is therefore answerable to the inescapably 
temporal, situated character of talk-in-interaction.  
 
 
5. The temporal contingency of interaction 
 
Capturing the temporal contingency of interaction on a transcript – 
representing time through space – thus necessitates the recording of lack of 
talk – silence – as surely as it does talk itself. For participants themselves 
orient to absence of talk, and its placement and extent, as a distinct 
interactional object, as anyone who has had an invitation or question greeted 
with silence knows; so in the following, the recognizability of a delayed 
response to the invitation as adumbrating a refusal that enables the inviter to 
start to reformulate (at l.3) the invitation so as to receive an acceptance:22 
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(10) (From Boden and Molotch, 1994:266) 
 
1A Would you like to meet now? 
2→ (0.6) 
3A [Or late- 
4B [Well, perhaps not now. Maybe in ’bout five minutes? 
  
For it is systematically the case that so-called ‘dispreferred’ responses 
(negative answers to questions, declinations of invitations, refusals of offers 
and requests, for example) are produced in generic ways, with some or all of 
the following features: turn-initial particles (‘well…’), dysfluency, accounts, 
but in the first instance, delay, quite independently of particular speakers or 
social contexts. A number of observations are made analytically possible by 
the transcription of silence, and its placement on a separate line. The turn-
construction component, which allocates one TCU to each speaker in the 
first instance,23 and the turn-allocation component of the turntaking system 
(Sacks et al., 1974:702-3) and the set of rules which governs them, all 
identify both the person who should speak on the completion of the turn in 
l.1, and the place at which they should speak. It should be stressed at this 
point that it is by no means a given that what looks syntactically or 
semantically like, say, a question, interactionally always demands an answer 
(what are vernacularly known as ‘rhetorical questions’, for example, may be 
performing – and understood to be performing – agreements; see Schegloff 
(1984) for a case in point). It is thus the turntaking system which requires an 
answer to come ‘next’(Sacks et al., 1974:725, FN33). So here the normative 
operation of the turntaking system requires, at the first possible completion 
of the turn in l.1, a response to the invitation. What the registering of the 
silence in l.2 does, then, is to make clear that a response which was 
normatively due in that place was not produced; the silence which ensues 
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upon the production of l.1, then, is unambiguously B’s (the placement of the 
silence after A’s talk in l.1 would misleadingly have attributed it to A). It 
also shows the radically different interactional import of interturn and 
intraturn silences: compare, for example, the intraturn silences in Mary’s 
telling of her story in extract (9), lls.23-6, where talk by another is not 
hearably absent. The transcription of silence and its placement thus allows 
us to register that something is missing, and moreover what that something 
is and who it is attributable to. Allows us to register because what ensues as 
a consequence of that silence displays that it is surely registered by the 
participants themselves. For what the silence also allows us to see is that ‘Or 
late-’ is not characterizable simply as a continuation of l.1. It is, rather, a 
response to l.2, which indicates a dispreferred response in the works. As a 
response to that silence the turn is syntactically built as a continuation 
(‘Or…’), retrospectively casting the first turn – which on its production was 
built both syntactically and prosodically to be complete – as not, in fact, 
having been complete. It thus converts an interturn silence into an intraturn 
pause, thus neutralizing the negative interactional implications of the 
former, and thereby maximizes the possibility of a preferred response.24 
Once again, we see the implementation of grammatical resources to 
interactional ends, rendered visible only by means of a transcription system 
which captures what the participants themselves are demonstrably oriented 
to. In so doing, it allows us to see that the absence of something may be 
identifiable as an absence of something specific, and that it may shape what 
gets said as surely as actions through talk itself.  
72 
The identification of such absences is, of course, only made possible 
by the prior identification of normative organizations operating in 
interaction, among which are turntaking and sequence organization (see 
Schegloff,  1995a) and the organization of preference (see Heritage (1984), 
Pomerantz (1984) and Schegloff (1988a)) and repair, addressed to problems 
in speaking, hearing and understanding (see, inter alia, Schegloff et al. 
(1977), Schegloff (1979, 1992)). These intersecting levels of organization 
provide normative structures by which courses of action (or, indeed, as we 
have seen, inaction) are recognizable and interpretable. Thus turntaking, 
sequence organization and preference are all implicated in the recognition of 
what the developing silence at l.2 of (10) might turn out to be; but, far from 
being mechanistic and deterministic, these very organizations provide, 
through grammatical and prosodic resources, the means by which one 
course of action is pursued over another. The choice to say, in response to 
the silence, ‘I said, would you like to meet NOW?’ – which would have 
endorsed the silence as an interturn pause – was available to the speaker, 
along with the interactional consequences of that choice. So, far from 
positing crudely behaviourist models of conduct – a charge sometimes 
levelled at conversation analysis – the uncovering of these levels of order 
and organization are the discovery of the resources with which speakers 
organize their worlds. In place of causal explanations it identifies 
constraints, and the possible consequences and relevancies of those 
constraints with reference to normative usage. In so doing it acknowledges 
that, while such usage is a reference point, participants make their own 
choices in the face of  interactional contingencies. As Heritage remarks:  
73 
 
“The organization of talk…participates in a dialectical 
relationship between agency and structure in social life 
and in a cognitive-moral way. Without a detailed texture 
of institutionalized methods of talking to orient to, social 
actors would inevitably lose their cognitive bearings. 
Under such circumstances, they would become incapable 
both of interpreting the actions of co-participants and of 
formulating their own particular courses of action. A 
texture of institutionalized methods of talking is thus 
essential if actors are to make continuous sense of their 
environments of action. Moreover, a range of moral 
considerations may be superimposed on these cognitive 
ones. For in the absence of a detailed institutionalization 
of methods of talking, actors could not be held morally 
accountable for their actions, and moral anomie would 
necessarily compound its cognitive counterpart. In the 
end, therefore, what is at stake is the existence of a form 
of social organization which is so strong and detailed as 
to render choices among courses of action both 
conceivable and possible” (Heritage, 1984: 292).  
 
 
6. Talk-in-interaction 
 
As we have seen, work in CA does not map straightforwardly onto the 
traditionally-recognized domains of linguistic inquiry. The data which form 
its focus might seem to locate its disciplinary home as Pragmatics. Its 
methods, however, have an analytical reach beyond the territory 
traditionally marked out by this domain. So work in recent years has, for 
example, addressed issues also relevant to lexical semantics (see, for 
example, Sorjonen, 1996, Heritage, 1998, 2002, and Clift, 2001), prosody 
(Couper-Kuhlen and Selting, 1996, Local, 1996, and Couper-Kuhlen 2001), 
and syntax (Lerner, 1996, Schegloff, 1996b, Ono and Thompson, 1996, 
Ford et. al, 2002, and Thompson, 2002). Yet it is also evident that the study 
of naturally-occurring interaction necessitates reference to domains broader 
than those of traditional linguistics.  
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The increasing use of video data to capture the intrication of the 
visual into the verbal has revealed further ways in which participants may 
mobilize a range of resources allied to the sequential properties of particular 
linguistic objects in the service of interaction. So work by Marjorie 
Goodwin (1980) and Schegloff (1987) on headshakes accompanying talk 
demonstrates how the common interpretation of the lateral headshake as a 
gestural expression of the negative (a view with its origins in Darwin’s The 
Expression of Emotion in Man and Animal (1872)) and the vertical 
headshake, or nod, as a display of the affirmative is misleading; examination 
of video data proposes that lateral headshakes may be used to mark, not a 
feature of the turn itself, but rather a feature of its relationship to a prior 
turn. Thus they may indeed be used as a marker of the negative, but they 
may also be used to mark disagreement (even when the utterance it 
accompanies is emphatically positive) and to mark intensification (what 
Goodwin (1980) calls a marker of the ‘out of the ordinary’. And Charles 
Goodwin’s (1995) study of an aphasic man, for whom only ‘yes’, ‘no’ and 
‘and’ remain as the result of a stroke, shows very powerfully how these 
linguistic objects may be used in conjunction with gesture to prompt 
recipients to propose actions that are endorsed (with ‘yes’), rejected (with 
‘no’) and built on (with ‘and’). The relevant lexical properties here are 
sequence-expansion versus sequence-closure; just as ‘fine’ as a response to 
‘how are you’ closes down a sequence and ‘feeling lousy’ (say), opens it up, 
so ‘yes’ is sequence-terminating and ‘no’ and ‘and’ sequence-expanding 
(albeit in different ways), prompting the recipient to further searching – be it 
for a word, or an action. So while we have seen how talk-in-interaction sets 
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a limit on the scope of individual intentions, we can also see how by the 
same token it provides us with one of our most powerful resources: our co-
participants. It is thus in the mobilization of the interactional resources of 
the co-present other(s) that we see at its clearest the joint construction of 
action in interaction.  
The centrality of action to language use is perhaps best demonstrated 
in a context where what appears to be at issue is not action at all, but rather 
description. Reporting what someone said on a prior occasion would seem, 
on the face of it, to be an issue of accuracy, a question of being as faithful as 
possible to the original utterance; in short, getting the description right. In 
actual fact, as the following extended sequence shows, participants show 
themselves to be concerned not with description, but rather with action. This 
sequence, presented earlier as (9), is here reproduced as (11). We noted 
earlier the turntaking features in the first part of this excerpt, which show 
the speakers compelled to abandon turns when – according to the normative 
constraints of the turntaking system – the other has prior claims to talk. But 
equally here, in the production of the reported speech, we see that the other 
may be as much collaborator as constraint, a collaboration that here comes 
to fruition in lls. 40-42, where Adam takes over and completes the turn that 
Mary started: 
(11) (A=Adam; M=Mary) 
 
1A But I think my grandmother- MY GRAndmother for example wouldn’t  
2 want anything to do with (accepting charity). 
3 (0.9) 
4A She’s actually (0.5) quite (1.2) I mean [I- I suggested she= 
5M           [Stubborn, 
6A =actually apply for disa↑bility allowance. 
7 (1) 
8A and she said  
9 (2) 
10A she was complaining about the fact that she couldn’t go anywhere, 
76 
11 >an’< she(’d been taken away), she couldn’t afford to (---) by  
12 day, and I said (.) why didn’t you apply for disa↑bility 
allow>ance  
13 she said< (.hh) >I can’t get one of those< an’ I said well do you  
14 kno::w, no she hadn’t applie:d, an’ .hh= 
15M ↑Uh huh. (Sounds like a slurred ‘I know’) 
16A =an’ she was just not interested cos [it was a QUEstion of pri:de= 
17M        [↑That’s right. 
18A =for [he::r, I mean=  
19M      [Absolutely. 
20A =[I don’t understand that, [for them it’s:: 
21M  [My fath-      [My father’s sister.  
22 (0.7) 
23M The same thing. (0.4) And eventually her daughter-in-law, othey’re  
24 ↑not the best of friends anywayo, (0.6) and the daughter-in-law  
25 went- (.) went ahead she works in the Na[tional Health Service= 
26A           [an’ got it. 
27M and got it for her.  
28 (.) 
29A Y[e:s. 
30M  [And it’s CHA:nged my aunt’s li:fe. 
31 (0.4) 
32A I kno:w, it(’s [sad). 
33M      [I mean (.) she’s- she phones me, she’s 
housebound, 
34 totally. 
35 (0.8) 
36M ↑I once said to her (1.2) if you’ll admit: (0.6) if you will admit  
37 your disability, (.) I mean [she’s hadda (.) a peculiar leg, one= 
38A         [Hm. 
39M =(one at-) all her life. (0.5) Uhm, (0.2) you know you could get-  
40M→ ↑I’M:-  
41 (1) 
42A→ I’M NOT >[DISABLED, I’M FINE. I’(H)M- o(h)r I’m- I’m- I’ll £cope.£ 
43M       [(Dis-)  
44M >That’s right.< Anyway, her- her (s-) daughter-in-law went ahead  
45 and did it (1) and of course it’s changed her ↑life.= 
 
At l.42 Adam is effectively reporting what Mary’s aunt said to her – a 
reporting that we see endorsed by Mary herself in the next turn. Intuitively 
this would seem to be a logical impossibility. It certainly stretches the 
boundaries of what is familiar to us as reported speech, for what we hear is 
someone proposing to report what another has said when he was manifestly 
absent on its original production. In investigating how this extraordinary 
collaboration is made possible, and what it can tell us about what the 
participants understand the talk to be doing, we make the following brief 
observations.  
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In the first place, we have already registered Mary’s attempt to 
complete Adam’s turn in l.5 – a completion he does not endorse.25 It is the 
first indication in this sequence of an attempt by one speaker to align with 
the other. More explicit indicators come at the end of Adam’s story: ‘That’s 
right’ and ‘absolutely’. ‘That’s right’ is commonly used by speakers to 
affirm something that they already know – a conclusion they have already 
reached (as used by a teacher to affirm a pupil’s answer, for example), and 
provides a portent of the experience Mary will relate; ‘absolutely’, produced 
after it, constitutes an upgraded agreement of it and provides for her move 
to tell her own story. What she tells is recognizably built off the first story, 
in a spectacularly compressed way: ‘My father’s sister. The same thing’ (lls. 
21-3) which allows her to cut immediately to the outcome, with ‘And 
eventually’, proposing that her story matches Adam’s. What she then 
recounts from l.23 onwards is a classic ‘second story’ (Sacks, 1992a,b) in 
response to Adam’s, which is one way speakers display understanding of 
the story just told to them; as Lerner notes, such second stories are 
‘regularly designed to include both similar events and a similar relationship 
between narrator and story events (to) the relationship between narrator and 
story events in the preceding story’ (1993:232). At what is projectably the 
outcome of the story, after ‘went ahead’ in l.25, it is now Adam as recipient 
of the storytelling who attempts to complete the turn (without, it should be 
noted, Mary apparently soliciting it, despite the slight perturbation 
immediately beforehand; her talk continues straight into a parenthetical 
insert, and he chooses to talk alongside her, as it were) and Mary both 
accepts it in repeating what he says, while displaying a certain resistance to 
78 
it by adding to what he has proposed. However, having delivered the moral 
of the story, ‘it’s changed my aunt’s life’ and provided evidence to support 
it (l.33), she proceeds to recount the exchange that parallels that of Adam 
and his grandmother. She starts to animate her suggestion to her aunt, in 
what amounts to the same suggestion that Adam made to his grandmother: 
that she apply for disability allowance. She cuts off after ‘you could get’ at 
the very point where the rest is projectable – recognizable due to her prior 
claim that she is recounting a case of ‘the same thing’ as Adam and his 
grandmother. At this point, with the increased animation of her voice and 
the deictic shift from ‘you’ to ‘I’ she enacts herself being interrupted by 
someone clearly not willing to hear the rest. Adam’s characterisation of his 
grandmother as ‘just not interested’ (l.16) – as close-minded – here seems to 
be enacted with someone not even willing to listen, with ‘I’M-’ phonetically 
capturing the interactional collision with the prior suggestion in the course 
of its production. With the volume and pitch of what she portrays as her 
aunt’s interruption of her, Mary conveys the speaker’s vehement objection 
to something in her own interest, as Adam had portrayed his grandmother in 
lls. 10-14. It is is, of course, impossible to identify Mary’s pause at this 
point as either part of the animation of speechless and stupefied outrage, or 
simply a stalling: in any case it has, by this stage, provided Adam with just 
enough information to project a possible completion: what Jefferson (1983) 
calls a point of ‘adequate recognition’.   
Note that Adam does not simply complete the turn but in effect takes 
it over; the repetition of ‘I’M-’ here is necessitated by the heightened 
animation of the turn which it is completing, such that the redoing of ‘I’M-’ 
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in a similarly vehement manner provides for the recipient to recognize that 
the speaker is saying what the other was saying immediately beforehand; 
without it, a continuation on its own, with similar prosody, would risk not 
being recognized as a completion, but as a potential counterattack in its own 
right. In taking the turn over, Adam has to match features that are 
paralinguistic, linguistic and structural. Paralinguistically, the volume 
matches Mary’s increased loudness in indicating a switch of speaker and an 
incoming turn which is competitive (French and Local, 1983). Linguistically 
– specifically, syntactically – he is constrained by the set of possibilities 
after ‘I’m-’ in the construction of the turn. Structurally, he is constrained by 
the sequential aspects of the talk so far. Given that this is a second story, and 
given the ‘I said – she said’ structure of the preceding talk, which conveys 
contrasting positions, Adam is constrained to make a selection which 
matches the first story and stands in counterpoint to what Mary said.26 
Moreover, Adam shows that he is abiding by what Jefferson calls the ‘no 
later’ constraint which ‘relates to displaying that one does have some 
independent information and is using it. If one waits until the object has 
been completely produced, one does not prove that one knows, one merely 
claims it’ (1973:58-9). So as well as demonstrating – in its repetition, 
completion and timing – that he has analysed the beginning of Mary’s 
utterance syntactically, Adam also demonstrates an analysis of the prior 
turns and the wider activity in which they are engaged. In doing so he does 
not just assent to, or claim a shared stance: he displays it. This is, in turn, 
endorsed – with ‘That’s right’ – by Mary. Since Adam provides first one 
completion, ‘I’m not disabled, I’m fine’, and then (showing a possible 
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orientation to the extremity of this option), another, downgraded version 
‘…or I’ll- I’ll cope’, Mary’s endorsement might initially seem puzzling. 
Certainly Adam’s reporting cannot be characterized as reported speech 
under the traditional definition of that term: the faithful reporting of a 
proposition.  
What, then, does Mary’s endorsement compel Adam – and us – to 
understand? It would seem quite clear that what is at issue for the 
participants is precisely not what was said, but what was done. What first 
Adam and then Mary reports is making a suggestion that is vehemently 
rebutted; what Adam does at l.42 is thus complete the action projected for 
that turn by Mary, and it is to that completion – of action, not proposition – 
that ‘that’s right’ is addressed. Here, once again, we see compelling 
evidence that it is to actions rather than information that participants are 
oriented.27
It has, then, only been possible to grasp the understandings of 
utterances for participants by examining the wider sequence in which the 
focus of our (and their) attention is embedded. For the understanding of any 
utterance necessarily invokes the sequential context from which it emerges. 
The jointly-produced turn at lls. 40-42 above demands the most exquisite 
local attention to all levels of linguistic production, but it is only when we 
broaden the focus that we can see it as the culmination of the gradual 
convergence between the speakers through time.  
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Conclusion 
 
In the preceding pages I have aimed to give some sense of what may be 
gained from the examination of naturally-occurring materials. At some level 
intuitions play an important role in any linguistic study. The issue is not 
whether they have a role – they form the basis of any linguistic inquiry – but 
whether they are sufficient. For grammatical acceptability judgements they 
seem the most satisfactory alternative. But, as we have seen, for a whole 
dimension of investigation they constitute the starting, not the end point. In 
the first instance they provide resources for us to identify what is striking or 
salient in the materials at our disposal. They also, as we have seen, play a 
part in the development of an analysis. But it is ultimately analysis, and not 
intuition, which makes it possible to be accountable to these kinds of data. 
For the data compel us to look more broadly – at both the construction of a 
turn and its position in a sequence – than introspection affords, a perspective 
captured by Schegloff’s remark that ‘…both position and composition are 
ordinarily constitutive of the sense and import of an element of conduct that 
embodies some phenomenon or practice’ (1993:121). Investigating 
interaction transcribed in a way which captures what partipants show 
themselves to be orienting to, CA attempts to study language and its 
structures in its most basic environment – conversation and its adaptations – 
and in its evolving temporal production. Of course, its forensic methods will 
not suit everyone. But without these, analysis loses its traction on the 
linguistic construction of particular interactional moments and becomes  
mere interpretation;28 after all, interactional competence is not ultimately 
separable from the contexts in which it is instantiated. And of course, the 
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materials are available for inspection against their analysis, rendering the 
methods by which analytic results are achieved transparent in ways which 
experimentation itself seeks to emulate. As Schegloff observes, naturally-
occurring materials: 
 
“appear to introduce elements of contingency, of 
variability, of idiosyncrasy, which are often taken to 
undermine the attainability of ideals of clarity, 
comparability, descriptive rigor, disciplined inquiry, etc. 
Meeting such goals is taken to require experimental 
control, or at least investigators’ shaping of the materials 
to the needs of inquiry – standardization (of stimuli, 
conditions, topics, etc.), conceptually imposed 
measurement instruments, etc. But in the name of science 
the underlying natural phenomena may be being lost, for 
what is being excised or suppressed in order to achieve 
control may lie at the very heart of the phenomena we 
are trying to understand. One is reminded of Garfinkel’s 
(1967:22) ironic comment about the complaint that, were 
it not for the walls, we could better see what is holding 
the roof up” (1996c:468). 
 
It is, then, what CA is able to capture which makes for its distinctive 
contribution to linguistics. It has made possible the discovery of order in the 
organization of talk that we hitherto did not, and otherwise could not, know 
existed. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1 I am indebted to two referees for ‘Lingua’ and to Bob Borsley for their 
helpful suggestions at an earlier stage of this paper. I am also grateful to 
Emanuel A. Schegloff, Andrew Spencer and Ray Wilkinson for their 
valuable comments on the final draft. 
2 The field of what has come to be known as ‘Conversation Analysis’ is 
perhaps more accurately referred to as the study of talk-in-interaction, for it 
takes as its data sources the range of interactional contexts beyond ordinary, 
so-called ‘mundane’ conversation (such as that in (1), from a counselling 
context). It is for this reason that the term ‘talk’ is here throughout preferred 
to ‘conversation’. However, as the earlier and so now more widely 
recognised term for this domain of study, ‘conversation analysis’ is adopted 
here for reasons of familiarity. See also FN 18. 
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3 The transcription for CA was devised by Gail Jefferson, and is supplied in 
the Appendix. 
4 The transcription at any given time represents the transcriber’s best efforts 
to capture, in detail, what is heard on the tape; but this, of course, this begs 
the question of the objectivity of any transcription. In this domain of work 
the data are represented by the recording, not the transcription, which should 
always be available for revision alongside it. 
5 I use ‘utterance’ here in its basic sense of ‘the thing said’, to be 
distinguished from ‘turn’ as a shorthand for ‘turn-at-talk’, which places an 
utterance in an interactional sequence. 
6 I am indebted to Nikki Parker for permission to use this data excerpt. 
7 Indeed, this in underlined in the therapist’s very next turn, l.8, where what 
again looks like a directive ‘…say to yourself…’ is met instead by an 
assenting ‘mm’. 
8 The recording should always be available. 
9 See Schegloff (1995a:156ff.) for observations on the ordering of responses 
to turns which implement more than one action. 
10 See Schegloff, 1996b:116-117, FN8: “To describe some utterance, for 
example as a ‘possible invitation’ or a ‘possible complaint’ is to claim that 
there is a describable practice of talk-in-interaction which is able to do 
recognizable invitations or complaints (a claim which can be documented 
by exemplars of exchanges in which such utterances were so recognized by 
their recipients), and that the utterance now being described can be 
understood to have been produced by such a practice, and is thus analyzable 
as an invitation or as a complaint. This claim is made, and can be defended, 
independent of whether the actual recipient on this occasion has treated it as 
an invitation or not, and independent of whether the speaker can be shown 
to have produced it for recognition as such on this occasion”. Thus the class 
of utterances known as ‘pre’s’  are recognizable as such, independently of 
whether they come to fruition, so to speak, in the action to which they are 
preliminaries. 
11 Levinson, 1983 and Schegloff, 1988b show how the investigation of these 
types of utterance – what in speech act theory  are indirect speech acts – in 
empirical materials invites the reanalysis of such utterances as ‘pres’. 
12 Other studies of repetitions – which do not look at the sequential 
environment of their deployment – include Jucker (1994) and Blakemore 
(1993) from a Relevance-theoretic perspective, and Norrick (1987) and 
Tannen (1997a,b). The latter three include within their scope 
transformations such as paraphrase and reformulation. It would seem that 
from an interactional perspective such transformations are alternatives to 
repetitions and collapsing them risks underspecifying both practices (see 
Schegloff, 1996a:FN 9). 
13 Notwithstanding ‘wiseguy’ responses such as ‘I know, I was there’ which, 
by very dint of their recognizability as such, throw into relief routine 
responses to such utterances as noticings, rather than informings (which 
‘wiseguy’ responses propose). 
14 Viz, Schegloff 1995a:82, FN30: ‘The initial understanding might be that 
an interactional noticing can only follow a perceptual/cognitive one, but, of 
course, one can say “Isn’t that a new X?” when one “knows” it is not; an 
interactional noticing need not be engendered by a perceptual/cognitive one. 
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And many (perhaps most) perceptual/cognitive noticings do not get 
articulated interactionally at all. But one key normative trajectory is an 
interactional noticing presented as occasioned by a perceptual/cognitive 
one’. 
15 Canonically noticings are placed as early as possible in the interactions 
such that in their absence they may be solicited or prompted (‘D’you notice 
anything different…?’) (Schegloff, 1995a:81) or, when placed later than the 
routinely early position, from the noticer’s perspective marked as ‘out-of-
place’ by some kind of misplacement marker (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973) 
(‘by the way’/‘incidentally’/‘hey’/‘oh’…). 
16 One reader of this paper queries the use of the term ‘hearable’, so some 
clarification is in order. ‘Hearable’ is not here simply an unwieldy substitute 
for ‘understandable’. It makes a specific claim about the public availability 
of an utterance (say), to be heard as doing something, where what is 
understood remains inscrutable. 
17 Jefferson (1980) notes how some responses, e.g. ‘pretty good’ in response 
to ‘how are you’ are what she calls ‘trouble-premonitory’, namely that they 
may portend the subsequent telling of a trouble which provides for the 
initial response specifically not being ‘Fine’. 
18 The words ‘for conversation’ should perhaps be stressed here, for it will 
be noted that the overwhelming focus in CA to date has been on the 
structures of so-called ‘mundane conversation’ as the domain in which 
interactional competence is developed. The CA work which focuses on 
other types of interaction – the institutional talk of medical and courtroom 
encounters, interviews, and calls to the emergency services (see, for 
example, the collection in Drew and Heritage, 1992), to name but a few, 
have displayed compellingly how the very identity of these institutional 
interactions derives from the means by which participants adapt the 
turntaking system for conversation to the particular purposes of their 
institutions by selection and reduction of the full range of conversational 
practices (see Drew and Heritage, 1992:25-7). In endorsing the ‘baseline’ 
identity of conversation, such work also throws into relief the risks of 
making claims about general linguistic usage based on material gathered 
outside ordinary conversational contexts. Schegloff, for example, notes how 
what questioners in ordinary conversation are doing is systematically 
different from what interviewers in various types of interviews are doing, 
such that, in the latter case “‘that it is an interview’ may hover over the 
occasion and its participants as a continuing set of relevances showing up in 
this or that respect what we could recognize for its ‘interviewness’” 
(1993:111). 
19 There have been pragmatic treatments of what what one might term 
fragmentary utterances, such as Stainton (1994, 1997). Where CA differs 
from approaches such as these is in its treatment of an object such as ‘At?’ 
not as a fragment or elliptical version of a larger unit, but as complete in 
itself, since the participants themselves treat it as complete in itself. 
20 So observant are speakers of the norms of the turntaking system that even 
what one might consider to be purely reactive behaviour has been shown to 
be carefully ordered and placed with respect to it. Thus Whalen and 
Zimmerman (1998) show how displays of what is known vernacularly as 
‘hysteria’ on the part of callers to emergency services may be carefully 
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regulated so as not to obscure the turn of the call taker; and Heath (1989) 
shows how the social organization of the medical examination governs the 
participants’ management of the expression of pain. Thus if a doctor is 
manipulating part of a patient’s anatomy, the patient may initiate a cry of 
pain not with reference to the moment at which presumably the pain has 
been experienced but at the point at which it is his/her turn to speak (or 
moan) in the turntaking system of the examination. 
21 “…The very conception of action having its origins in the acting 
individual’s ‘intention’ treats the single action as the unit to be analyzed, 
and the single individual as the proper locus of analysis…here again the 
availability of tape-recorded, repeatably inspectable material, is deeply 
consequential. If one is committed to understanding actual actions (by 
which I mean ones which actually occurred in real time), it is virtually 
impossible to detach them from their context for isolated analysis with a 
straight face. And once called to attention, it is difficult to understand their 
source as being in an ‘intention’ rather than in the immediately preceding 
course of action to which the act being examined is a response and to which 
it is built to address itself” (Schegloff,  2003:39). 
22 Space constraints forbid a fuller account of preference, which is the 
organizing principle at work here; but see, for example, Heritage (1984), 
Pomerantz (1984), and Schegloff (1988a). 
23 After the first TCU, speakers have to deploy specific practices (such as 
storytelling prefaces) to gain more – keeping the door open, so to speak. See 
extract (11), which shows both participants implementing such procedures. 
24 See Schegloff (1995b) for a more extended example across several turns; 
and Ford (1993) on the use of increments to completed turns after silences, 
foreshadowing incipient disagreement or rejection. 
25 Adam’s subsequent abandonment of the characterization of his 
grandmother in favour of a telling which displays her attitude may be seen 
to orient to a general preference in interaction for displaying over 
characterizing when the characteristic proposed is negative. 
26 To invoke a traditional linguistic distinction, Adam has to make both a 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic selection of the available options. 
27 Of course, giving information (in the form of description, say) may be an 
action in its own right. 
28 “One key difference between ‘interpretation’ and ‘analysis’ …is that 
analysis lays bare how the interpretation comes to be what it is – ie., what 
about the target (utterance, gesture, intonation, posture, etc.) provides for the 
interpretation that has been proposed for it. So interpretation may be more 
or less subtle, deep, insightful, etc. but remains vernacular interpretation 
nonetheless; the issue is not its excellence. Analysis is ‘technical’; it 
explicates by what technique or practice of uptake the interpretation was 
arrived at. And analysis grounds those claims in the observable conduct of 
the parties whose interaction is being examined” (Schegloff, 1996d:26) 
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APPENDIX 
 
The transcripts are notated according to the system developed by Gail 
90 
Jefferson, with the following conventions (adapted from Ochs et al. 
1996:461-5): 
 
[ Separate left square brackets, one above the other on two 
successive lines with utterances by  
[ different speakers, indicates a point of overlap onset 
] Separate right square brackets, one above the other on two 
successive lines with utterances by  
] different speakers indicates a point at which two overlapping 
utterances both end, where one 
 ends while the other continues, or simultaneous moments in 
overlaps which continue: 
4A She’s actually (0.5) quite (1.2) I mean [I- I suggested she= 
5M           [Stubborn, 
6A =actually apply for disa↑bility allowance. 
= Equal signs ordinarily come in pairs – one at the end of a 
line and another at the start of the next line or one shortly 
thereafter. They are used to indicate two things: 
 (1) If the two lines of transcription connected by the signs 
are by the same speaker, then there was a single, continuous 
utterance with no break or pause, which was broken up in order 
to accommodate the placement of overlapping talk: 
4A She’s actually (0.5) quite (1.2) I mean [I- I suggested she= 
5M           [Stubborn, 
6A =actually apply for disa↑bility allowance. 
 (2) If the lines connected by the signs are by different 
speakers, then the second followed the first with no 
discernable silence between them, or was ‘latched’ to it. 
4R Oh:. Uh huh.= 
5E =I fee:l a bi:ssel verschickert. 
 (0.5) Numbers in parentheses indicate silence, represented in tenths 
of a second. Silences may be marked either within turns or 
between them. 
(.) A dot in parentheses indicates a ‘micropause’, ordinarily less 
than 2/10ths of a second. 
 These options are represented below: 
04A She’s actually (0.5) quite (1.2) I mean [I- I suggested  
.?, The punctuation marks indicate intonation. The period 
indicates a falling, or final intonation contour, not 
necessarily the end of a sentence. A question mark indicates a 
rising intonation, not necessarily a question, and a comma 
indicates ‘continuing’ intonation, not necessarily a clause 
boundary.  
 ::: Colons are used to indicate prolongation or stretching of the 
sound preceding them. The more colons, the longer the 
stretching. 
-  A hyphen after a word or part of a word indicates a cut-off or 
self-interruptions, often done with a glottal or dental stop.  
word Underlining is used to indicate some form of stress or 
emphasis, either by increased loudness or higher pitch. 
WORD Especially loud talk relative to that which surrounds it may 
be indicated by upper case. 
owordo The degree signs indicate that the talk between them is 
markedly softer than the talk around them. 
↑↓ The up or down arrows mark particularly emphatic rises or 
falls in pitch. 
>word< The combination  of ‘more than’ and ‘less than’ symbols 
indicates that the talk between them is compressed or rushed.  
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hh Hearable aspiration is shown where it occurs in the talk by 
the letter ‘h’: the more ‘h’s, the more aspiration. 
.hh If the aspiration is an inhalation it is preceded by a dot.  
(---) Words unclear and so untranscribable 
(word) Best guess at unclear words 
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